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Ethnic Identity and 
Constitutional Design 
for Africa 
ALEMANTE G. SELASSIE* 
Recently, unexpected areas of the world have experienced a 
remarkable democratic resurgence and a new consciousness of 
rights. 1 In country after country, from Romania to Ethiopia, citi-
zens have risen up in valiant acts of self-determination to sweep 
away long-established dictatorships and to reclaim their rights 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
and Mary. 
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I The widespread call for freedom and rights in many lands has reinvigorated the 
hope that constitutional liberties are finally attainable even in countries lacking demo-
cratic traditions. See Gibson K. Kuria, The Rule of Law in Kenya and the Status of Human 
Rights, 16 YALE]. INT'L L. 217, 233 (1991); Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Options 
for Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 EMORY L.J. 745 (1991); Symposium, Transitions of Democ-
racy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 965 ( 1990). One writer has argued, 
however, that "[w]hat is being universalized is not democracy, but the capitalist eco-
nomic system and its attendant form of government-historically antithetical to pre-
cisely those individual liberties at the heart of any fundamental charter of human 
rights." Anthony Chase, The Rule of Law and the Capitalist State: Bills of Rights in jeopardy, 
65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 85, 87-88 ( 1991) (footnote omitted). Professor Chase even doubts 
"the survival, let alone the vitality," of the U.S. Bill of Rights. /d. at 88. 
The ubiquity and strength of the demand for greater civil liberties and more ac-
countable governments everywhere have rekindled a keen interest in the principles and 
practices of constitutional government and the rule of law. See generally EDWARD ]. 
ERLER, THE AMERICAN POLITY: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
GoVERNMENT ( 1991 ); Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State ( Rechtss-
taat), THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FoRUM 1 (1991); Mark R. Beissinger, The Party and the 
Rule of Law, 28 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41 ( 1990); Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives of Democ-
racy and the Rule of Law, 18]. L. & Soc'y 353 (1991); Issa G. Shivji, Law in Independent 
Africa: Some Reflections on the Role of Legal Ideology, 46 OHio ST. L. J. 689 (1985); What 
Should a Law-governed State Be?, SoviET L. & Gov'T, Summer 1989, at 51-65. 
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and dignity.2 As Hannah Arendt argues, however, "[T]here is 
nothing more futile than rebellion and liberation unless they are 
followed by the constitution of the newly won freedom." 5 John 
Adams, commenting on the newly written constitution of the 
United States, suggested, "Neither morals nor riches, nor disci-
pline of armies, nor all these together will do without a 
constitution. " 4 
A wave of constitution-making has accompanied newly demo-
cratic nations' shift from authoritarian rule5 and underscored the 
importance of a suitable constitution to democratic governance.6 
In the Western liberal tradition, constitution-making is worth the 
effort only if it secures individual dignity' and restrains state 
2 Since 1989 several countries in Eastern Europe have undertaken the transition 
from single-party rule to constitutional democracy. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in East-
ern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447;447 (1991). In Africa numerous dicta-
torships have fallen. See generally Samuel Decalo, The Process, Prospects and Constraints of 
Democratization in Africa, 91 AFR. AFF. 7 (1992). Africa, at a "political dead-end morally" 
and "economically bankrupt," is currently susceptible to the wave of democratization 
that is sweeping the world. Id. at 14. With the end of the Cold War, moreover, Africa 
can no longer obtain material aid by playing the United States and the Soviet Union 
against each other. /d. at 17. Instead, the continent must become democratically more 
presentable in order to continue to carry favor with the United States, World Bank, and 
IMF. /d. at 22. 
S HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 41 (1963). 
4 /d. (quoting John Adams). 
5 The current wave of constitution-making in Eastern Europe has reached Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. See Elster, supra note 2, at 447. History 
has seen a number of similar waves of constitution-making efforts. See EDWARD McWHIN-
NEY, CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 3-5 (1981); Elster, supra 
note 2. 
Constitution-making takes two distinct forms: "In the first, constitution-making is 
concerned with demarcating the basic political relationships among the constituent 
groups: what will be the structure of the state, what modes of representation will pre-
vail, what conception of society and the relations among groups will be given institu-
tional expression?" Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon, Introduction: The Politics of 
Constitutional Change, in REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 1, 8 (Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985). In the second, where the 
constitution serves as not only the expression of a fundamental relationship but also as a 
statement of precise decision-making rules, constitution-making also includes the task of 
adapting or modernizing rules in order to achieve administrative rationality and coordi-
nation. /d. at 9. The democratic changes in most countries have required constitution-
making of the first type, which "reveals in a microcosm the political climate of the larger 
polity during the transition." ANDREA BONIME·BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOC· 
RAcY: THE PoLITICS oF CoNSTITUTION-MAKING 2 (1987). 
6 On the importance of the process of constitution-making to democratic govern-
ance, see generally BoNIME-BLANC, supra note 5. 
7 T. R. S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Ruk of Law: Democracy and Constitutional-
ism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L. J. Ill, Ill (1985) (arguing that modern Anglo-American constitu-
tional theory is preoccupied with devising a means for protection and enhancement of 
individual human rights in a manner consistent with the democratic basis of the institu-
tions of these societies). See also joHN E. FINN, CoNSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: PoLITICAL VIO-
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power from invading the private arena.8 The twin concepts of 
limited government and individual rights capture the enduring 
value and the very purpose of every "true" constitution.9 Ac-
cording to S. A. De Smith, an earlier commentator on sub-
Saharan Mrican constitutions, constitutionalism in its formal 
sense means: 
the principle that the exercise of political power shall be 
bounded by rules, rules which determine the validity of 
legislative and executive action by prescribing the proce-
dure according to which it must be performed or by delim-
iting its permissible content. . . . Constitutionalism 
becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb 
the arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by 
the wielders of political power, and to the extent that 
within the forbidden zones upon which authority may not 
trespass there is significant room for the enjoyment of in-
dividualliberty.10 
To what extent is this traditional perspective adequate to 
meet the needs of sub-Saharan African nations? Two values are 
in tension. On the one hand, constitution-making should pre-
vent the exercise of unlimited state power that in the past thirty 
years of African independence has frequently resulted in massive 
violations of human rights.U Past policies encouraging economic 
development and nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa were 
held to require a truncated conception ofhuman rights! 2 These 
LENCE AND THE RuLE OF LAw 36 (1991) (in order to protect human dignity, Western 
constitutionalism focuses on limited power and public reason). 
8 Robert B. Seidman, Perspectives on Constitution-making: Independence Constitution for 
Namibia and South Africa, 3 LESOTHO LJ. 45, 50 ( 1987). 
9 In 1961, addressing a flurry of constitution-making in Eastern Europe, Asia, and 
Africa, Giovanni Santori proposed that many of the constitutions should be called 
"fa~ade constitutions." Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 
AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 853,861 (1962). Others used the terms "semantic" or "nominal" for 
these constitutions. See, e.g., Karl Loewenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in 
Our Revolutionary Age, in CoNSTITUTIONS AND CoNSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WoRLD WAR 
II 191, 204-06 (Arnold]. Zurcher ed., 1955). 
10 S. A. De Smith, Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth Today, 4 MALAYA L. REv. 205, 
205 (1962). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States 
Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights, 15 NovA L. REV. 1, 2 ( 1991) (identifying the three 
main characteristics that define American constitutionalism: consensual basis of govern-
ment, enumeration of specific rights guaranteed against government intrusion, and in-
dependence of and enforcement by the judiciary). 
11 See Iss a G. Shivji, State and Constitutionalism in Africa: A New Democratic Perspective, 18 
INT'Lj. Soc. L. 381, 383 (1990) (noting that "[c]onstitutionalism was eroded in sub-
stance even as constitutions continued to pay homage to some of its elements.") 
12 For example, julius Nyerere, ex-president of Tanzania, argued that Western con-
stitutionalism would tend to deny development. jULIUS NYERERE, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PARTY SYSTEM 195-203 ( 1961); see also S. K. B. Asante, Nation Building and Human Rights in 
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policies have been heavily criticized. 13 Today, African nations 
need to focus upon defining a "bill of rights" and designing ap-
propriate institutions, processes, and mechanisms to enforce 
human rights. Consequently, any new constitutional order in Af-
rica must incorporate basic individual rights in its design and 
protect them in actual practice. 
On the other hand, constitution-making in Africa must take 
into account the needs and stresses of the African experience. 14 
Constitution-making cannot be "an a priori exercise in taking 
principles from on high and parachuting them into any environ-
ment. ... " 15 Africans must heed what Robert Seidman describes 
as "the Law of Non-Transferability of Law." 16 While Africans 
will do well to borrow freely from the legal principles and institu-
tions that have worked elsewhere,l 7 their constitutions will not 
function and endure if they are not molded to meet their coun-
tries' special needs. African constitution-makers must avoid the 
tendency to copy uncritically constitutional provisions from other 
countries, as if constitution-making were "participation in an 
Emergent African Nations, 2 CoRNELL INT'L L. J. 72, 83 (1969) (discussing "the much can-
vassed thesis that the stark realities of nation-building in Africa do not admit of the 
luxury of human rights"); Keba M'Baye, Human Rights in Africa, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 583, 599 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds., 1982) (sug-
gesting that African governments have sacrificed human rights in the interests of devel-
opment and political stability). 
I !I See, e.g., P. Anyang Nyong'o, Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in 
Africa, 13 AFR. DEv., No. 1, at 71, 77 ( 1988) (arguing that "there is very little evidence 
that Africa has been better off in terms of economic growth and development because 
governments have no [sic] had to be bothered by popular pressures"). 
14 Every constitution constitutes a solution for the particular difficulties its authors 
perceive. Seidman, supra note 8, at 50. In the West, the central problem constitution-
makers perceived was the arrogance of state power and its corrupting influence. Design-
ing a means by which to limit this power thus became the standard constitutional solu-
tion in the West. /d. at 59. 
15 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL ENG!· 
NEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 10 1 (1991). 
16 ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAw AND DEVELOPMENT 34-36 (1978) (noting 
that "[l]egal transplants practically never work"). Edward McWhinney also expresses 
that the post-colonial imposition in developing nations of constitutions based on West-
ern models was: 
the too-ready application to non-European societies of essentially European 
constitutional stereotypes, without prior examination of whether the different 
communities concerned were at the same essential stages of political and eco-
nomic development, and whether, in consequence, the socio-economic infra-
structures that inevitably condition the operation of positive law prescriptions 
were the same. 
McWHINNEY, supra note 5, at 4. 
17 "There is nothing wrong with borrowing institutions. After all, how can any peo-
ple be expected to invent everything from scratch? The trick is to borrow the right 
institutions, those that are apt for the predicament of the borrowers." HoROWITZ, supra 
note 15, at 101. 
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elaborate buffet . . . from which the constitution-maker can fill 
her plate to her taste." 18 
For African constitution-makers, no issue is more perplexing 
or more critical than how African societies should treat ethnic 
identity. This is not a uniquely African situation; from the former 
Yugoslavia to Somalia to Canada, ethnic divisiveness remains 
problematic. But the seriousness of this question for African 
countries can hardly be overemphasized, and inattention to it 
cannot be excused. In the past, African regimes have suppressed 
ethnic demands in the interest of forging national unity and fos-
tering loyalties beyond the confines of ethnic and regional partic-
ularism; however, such suppressions have failed. The de facto 
break-up of Ethiopia19 and the civil war in the Sudan20 have re-
sulted from uprisings staged by ethnic groups demanding rights. 
Moreover, in the present period of democratic resurgence, world 
opinion is decidedly against the maintenance of the multi-ethnic 
state system when it rests simply on the denial or suppression of 
ethnic claims.21 Nothing less than the future hope of Africa for 
stability, democracy, and development is at stake. Thus, consti-
tutional design for Africa must provide a framework for ac-
comodating ethnic differences without impairing national unity 
and stability. 
This Article explores the extent to which African constitution-
making and constitutional development should take ethnic claims 
into account. The Article proceeds from the author's belief that 
resolution of the fundamental problems confronting many of 
these countries-the crises of national integration and political 
18 Seidman, supra note 8, at 56. 
19 Ethiopia is on the verge of disintegration. In the north, the Eritrean secession-
ists have already formed an independent government with the collusion and blessing of 
the Ethiopian transitional government that was established soon after the demise of the 
dictatorial regime in May 1991. There are ominous signs that the precedent established 
for Eritrea may embolden or encourage other ethnic groups to demand similar 
dispensations. 
20 The Sudan has experienced civil war intermittently since 1956. See generally Dun-
stan M. Wai, Geoethnicity and the Margin of Autonomy in the Sudan, in STATE VERSUS ETHNIC 
CLAIMS: AFRICAN Poucv DILEMMAS 304 (Donald Rothchild & Victor A. Olorunsola eds., 
1983). In recent months, the Southern Peoples Liberation Army has declared that, un-
less the country makes fundamental democratic changes, it will seek political divorce 
from the rest of the Sudan. See F.B.I.S. (Sub-Saharan Africa) June 1, 1992, at 1. 
21 Joseph E. Magnet, Collective Rights, Cultural Autonomy and the Canadian State, 32 
McGILL LJ. 170, 175 (1986) (changes in world system thwart use of multinational state 
as an organizing unit of politics). The breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia and the international recognition accorded to the successor states demon-
strate this proposition. See generally S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to 
Advance Ethnic or Nationality Right Claims, 75 IowA L. REv. 837 (1990). 
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legitimacy-requires the recognition and entrenchment of ethnic 
claims as part of a new constitutional settlement in Africa as a 
matter not only of practical expediency but also constitutional 
theory. Part I of the Article discusses the role and importance of 
ethnicity in the process of self-definition and identifies in that 
process a major source of ethnic conflict and division that contin-
ues to plague these countries. Part II suggests why, despite the 
importance of ethnic claims in constitution-making, African con-
stitution-makers in the past lacked specific concern for ethnic-
based claims in constitutional design. Two factors seem to ac-
count for the lack of such concern: the influence ofliberal consti-
tutionalism, with its exclusive focus on the individual, and the 
extreme sensitivity of African regimes to ethnic questions. Part 
III argues that neither fac.tor justifies ignoring ethnic claims in 
constitutional design. In fact, recognition of ethnic claims will 
protect and advance important fundamental values. Part IV criti-
cally examines the elements of a new approach to constitutional-
ism presently emerging in Ethiopia22 to determine the extent to 
which ethnic claims may be given explicit constitutional ground-
ing. The Article concludes that this approach corrects classical 
liberal constitutionalism's emphasis on individual rights and con-
sequent failure to adequately address ethnic claims. However, as 
the Ethiopian experiment suggests, in addressing such claims, 
constitution-makers may go further than is prudent or necessary 
to deal with the motivations underlying the assertion of group 
ethnic claims. 
I. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 
Before discussing the extent to which ethnicity may be consid-
ered in the design of African constitutions, it is important to ex-
plore briefly the important role that ethnic identity plays in the 
process of self-definition. The perspective gained from explor-
ing ethnic identity's role is helpful in two ways. First, it helps 
identify and enhance understanding of a major source of ethnic 
conflict and division. Second, it offers constitution-makers sug-
gestions for mitigating ethnic problems through constitutional 
design. 
22 Ethiopia is appropriate for such examination for two reasons. First, it is proba-
bly the only country in Africa which has spawned numerous ethnicity-based movements 
demanding ethnic rights. Second, it is so far the only country in which these movements 
have succeeded in entrenching their ethnic claims in a constitutional document. For a 
discussion of these claims, see infra notes 197-249 and accompanying text. 
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A. Ethnic Identity and Self-Definition 
An old European saying identifies an ethnic group as a group 
of "persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a 
common dislike of their neighbors."211 This neatly sums up the 
basic characteristics of ethnic group identity: a notion of unity 
and a notion of being different from others. Both of these as-
pects arise from common origins, historical experiences, and val-
ues that are not shared by others.24 In reality, as the adage 
suggests, this perception may be erroneous. 
Erroneous or not, group identity plays a major part in both 
the process of self-definition and the process of definition by 
others.25 "In defining ourselves, we rely heavily on others' views 
of us, real or imagined, and on our connections with others," 
ethnic or otherwise.26 Rarely does a person engage in self-defini-
tion without some reference to his or her connections to others.27 
In numerous societies, individuals largely identify themselves by 
their membership in an ethnic group.28 
Why does ethnic identity play a role in self-definition? What 
is it about ethnicity that compels one to define oneself in its 
terms? The ubiquity and salience of ethnic identity indicate that 
it responds to essential needs. Harold Isaacs suggests two needs 
in particular: the need to belong and the need for self-esteem.29 
Few individuals can do without either. Kenneth Karst has noted 
the importance of group identity in satisfying the need to belong 
and the self-esteem that goes with the satisfaction of it: "[Bonds 
to family, religion, and ethnic group] not only provide a tie to 
other people, but also offer us our very selves. No wonder that 
we develop a bond 'to the very tie itself.' " Helen Lynd captured 
the idea in one simple but elegant sentence: "Some kind of an-
swer to the question 'Where do I belong?' is necessary for an 
2!1 KARL DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 3 (1969). 
24 NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 102 
(1988). Awareness of the existence of other ethnic groups is a prerequisite to ethnic 
consciousness. That is, the concept of "us" requires the concept of "them." Walker 
Connor, The Politics of Ethnonationalism, 27 J. INT'L AFF. 1, 2-3 (1973). 
25 See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 
N.C. L. REv. 303, 307-09 (1986). 
26 /d. at 307. 
27 /d. Thus one is "a mother," "a law student," "[a] black," "a jew," "an old man," 
"[a] child of Korean immigrants," etc. /d. 
28 See generally DoNALD HoROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 6-7 (1985). 
29 Harold R. Isaacs, Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe, in ETHNICITY: THEORY 
AND EXPERIENCE 29, 34 (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975). 
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answer to the question 'Who am I?' " 30 Indeed, the language of 
ethnicity "is suffused with the intimacy of kinship referents."31 It 
identifies those who belong and those who do not. 
Ethnicity is especially significant in the lives of individuals in 
less developed countries, where secondary identities deriving 
from class, educational, occupational, or professional status are 
less pronounced. 32 Its importance in the process of self-defini-
tion in these countries is indicated by the overwhelmingly ethnic 
responses that such open-ended questions as "Who are you?" 
tend to elicit.33 For example, "I am an Oromo" instead of "I am 
an Ethiopian" and "I am a Kikuyu" instead of "I am a Kenyan" 
are labels often used to identify oneself in these ethnically seg-
mented societies. 
Viewed from this perspective, ethnicity has very little or no 
offensive connotation. Indeed, its role in the process of self-
identification and identification by others makes it an inevitable 
component ofhuman existence.34 But the proliferation of ethnic 
conflicts all over the world belies or casts doubt on ethnic iden-
tity's positive effects. The next section briefly explains why, de-
spite its importance to self-definition, ethnic identity has tended 
to foster division and conflict. 
B. Ethnic Difference and Fear of Domination 
No single theory can adequately explain the causes of ethnic 
conflict.35 Nonetheless, one explanation having implications for 
30 Karst, supra note 25, at 308 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Donald Horowitz, an 
influential scholar on the subject of ethnicity, identifies the needs for familiarity, com-
munity and emotional support as important needs met by ethnicity. HOROWITZ, supra 
note 28, at 88. Ethnicity is also useful as an instrument for "mobilizing and aggregat-
ing" the interests of an ethnic group in competition with other ethnic, occupational, and 
business interests for state-controlled political and economic resources. CHAZAN, supra 
note 24, at 105-106; see also Daniel Bell, Ethnicity and Social Change, in ETHNICI1Y: THEORY 
AND ExPERIENCE, supra note 29, at 141, 169 (noting ethnicity's role as "a new mode of 
seeking political redress in the society"). 
31 Crawford Young, Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity, DAEDELUS, 
Spr. 1982, at 71, 74; HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 57. 
32 See Ibrahim J. Wani, Cultural Preservation and the Challenges of Diversity and Na-
tionhood: The Dilemma of Indigenous Cultures in Africa, 59 UMKC L. REv. 611, 640 ( 1991). 
33 HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 6. 
34 See Isaacs, supra note 29, at 32; see also ALASDAIR MACIN1YRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 205 (1981) ("[T]he story of my life is always embedded in the 
story of those communities from which I derive my identity"). 
35 For an in-depth and critical review of these theories, see HoROWITZ, supra note 
28, at 95-228. For a brief discussion of some of these theories as they pertain to Africa, 
see Dunstan M. Wai, Sources of Communal Conflicts and Secessionist Politics in Africa, 1 ETHNIC 
& RACIAL STUD. 286 (1978). Wai lists the following as "salient conditions that lead to 
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constitutional design is that the need to belong and the need for 
self-esteem-the very needs which ethnic identity fulfills-are 
themselves major sources of conflict. 36 Both of these needs are 
not merely individual but are also collective.37 Both are 
"achieved largely by social recognition,"38 with collective need 
receiving its recognition through political affirmation. 39 
The juxtaposition of two or more ethnic groups in the same 
political environment often results in each group attempting to 
disaffirm the other politically. Groups behave in this manner as a 
result of fear and distrust which are inherent in the very notion of 
group identity. As Karst explains: 
If my group identity tells me where I belong-and that I 
belong-it also tells me that you, who do not wear the 
same identifying labels, do not belong. We can trust the 
members of our own cultural group because we know the 
meanings of their behavior and know what to expect of 
them. Conversely, distrust of the members of a different 
cultural group flows from fear, not just of the unknown 
but fear that outsiders threaten our own acculturated 
views of the natural order of society. 40 
The fear and suspicion that differences in ethnic identity en-
gender are well documented. In Africa such fear and distrust 
first surfaced at the time that independence from colonialism was 
impending.41 In Mauritania, Chad, and Sudan, all of which con-
communal conflicts and subsequent attempts at secession in independent African 
states:" 
( 1) Cultural pluralism and value incompatibilities; 
(2) Historical hostilities and mutual distrust; 
(3) Psychological factors; 
(4) Right to self-determination; 
(5) Relative social and economic deprivation; 
(6) Elite instability and crisis of leadership; 
(7) Ideology and external factors; 
(8) Governmental ineptitude and closed channels of dissent. 
!d. at 287. 
36 See HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 181. Professor Horowitz argues that "(a] more 
fruitful explanation" of ethnic conflict lies in the "disparaging evaluations of group 
worth" that an ethnic group receives at the hands of another ethnic group. These evalu-
ations lead the disparaged group "to want to do something to retrieve [its] self-esteem." 
!d. A disparaging evaluation threatens the value of one's ethnic affiliations, which pro-
duces anxiety and defensiveness and thus leads to conflict. !d. 
37 /d. at 185. 
38 !d. 
39 !d. 
40 Karst, supra note 25, at 309; see also HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 181. 
41 See HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 188 (noting that the departure of the colonial 
rulers and the prospect of self-government produced intense anxiety and uncertainty 
regarding who would rule). 
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tain Arab and African populations, the persistent question has 
been: Is the state to be "Arab" or "African?"42 
Fear of ethnic domination defines much of African politics. 
"Kikuyu domination" is still feared in Kenya.43 Prior to 1991, 
the perception of "Amhara domination" fueled various ethnic 
uprisings in Ethiopia.44 And fear of "Tigre domination" has al-
ready begun to fester. 45 As one delegation to a Nigerian consti-
tutional conference stated: 
We all have fears of one another .... These fears may be 
real or imagined; they may · be reasonable or petty. 
Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be taken 
account of because they influence to a considerable degree 
the actions of the groups towards one another and, more 
important perhaps, the daily actions of the individual in 
each group towards individuals from other groups.46 
Fear and insecurity, in turn, foster intense competition for 
power. This kind of competition is a zero-sum game, with each 
group seeking to dominate the political environmentY The win-
ning group imposes its identity on the state, though it frequently 
may disguise it by projecting a culturally neutral image of the na-
tion.48 This imposition excludes the losers from the political 
42 /d. 
43 See id. 
44 The perception of Amhara domination is largely on account of official policies 
that in the past encouraged the use of Amharic, the language of the Amharas, in schools 
and government administration. Some commentators even claim that the Amhara refer 
to other ethnic groups in the country as "nationalities," which is used "derogatorily" to 
imply that other ethnic groups must some day be molded in the national image of the 
Amhara. See, e.g., Jason W. Clay, Nation, Tribe, and Ethnic Group in Africa, 9 CuLTURAL 
SuRVIVAL Q 2 (1985). But "nationality" is a term that came into vogue in Ethiopia with 
the rise of socialist thought in that country. It is not a term the Amharas invented. 
45 After the fall in May 1991 of the military dictatorship that had ruled Ethiopia 
since 1974, the Tigre-dominated Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front 
seized government power. Sam Kiley & Michael Binyon, Ethiopian Regime Dies in Short, 
Sharp Battle, THE TIMES, May 29, 1991, at l. The fear of Tigre domination has since 
become prevalent. 
46 l A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CoNFLICT IN NIGERIA: A DocuMENTARY 
SOURCEBOOK 1966-1969 14-15 ( 1971) (footnote omitted). 
47 This often leads to serious ethniC violence. See HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 189. 
The symbol used to express the intention to capture the state for one ethnic group 
varies from country to country. For example, in Nigeria the anti-Ibo riots of 1966 oc-
curred when the military regime headed by an Ibo seemed to favor Ibo officers in pro-
motion. /d. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the Official Language. Act, declaring 
Singhala the official language, marked the beginning of ethnic tension on the island. M. 
L. Marasinghe, Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, 37 INT'L 
& COMP. L.Q 551, 560-61 (1988). 
48 Crawford Young states that "Rwanda is unambiguously associated with Hutu 
domination, as Burundi is with Tutsi." Young, supra note 31, at 85. In Zaire the wide-
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community, undermines their confidence and wounds their 
group self-esteem. When wounded, the collective esteem " 'is 
like a bent twig, forced down so severely that when released, it 
lashes back with fury.' "49 
Sudan provides the most extreme illustration of this phenom-
enon. That country has been in civil war since the mid-1950's, 
because the Arab North has, since independence, sought to im-
pose its identity on the South.50 Successive governments in the 
North have self-righteously pursued policies aimed at Arabizing 
and Islamizing the largely Christian and animist South.51 The 
transformation of the Sudanese legal system through the applica-
tion of Sharia as of 1983 and the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic 
state are the latest examples of the North's tendency to treat the 
people of the South as second-class citizens. 52 
The consequences of such policies have been predictable. As 
the North persisted in defining the State in terms of its own eth-
nic identity, the South felt increasingly wounded and its struggle 
to preserve its own identity and self-worth intensified. As one 
scholar has noted, "A society which inflicts the distress of a sense 
of exclusion and inferiority cannot wholly succeed in assimilating 
into its affirmative consensus those whom it wounds.'' 53 In the 
case of Sudan, the South views the North as a force so alien that 
the South must seek political divorce.54 
II. AFRICAN APPROACHES TO ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. The General Setting 
1. Africa and Ethnic Diversity 
Sub-Saharan African states generally are divided by language, 
culture, and religion. This may seem unremarkable, as cultural 
spread perception is "that the state is identified with an Equateur and Lingaphone inner 
core .... " /d. 
49 Allister Sparks, Good and Bad Nationalism: South Africa Is the World in Microcosm, 
WASH. PosT, jan. 26, 1992, at C7 (quoting Oxford University philosopher Isaiah Berlin). 
50 See Wai, supra note 20, at 307-08 (discussing the imposition of Arabic and various 
Islamic customs in southern schools, including changing the weekly holiday from Sun-
day to Friday). 
51 See id. at 316 (noting that "the 'Sudanese state' has continuously since indepen-
dence reflected the identity of the Arab Northern Sudanese") (emphasis omitted). 
52 See generally Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Constitutionalism and Islamization in the Su-
dan, 1988 THIRD WoRLD LEGAL STUD. 99. 
53 Wai, supra note 20, at 316 (quoting EDWARD SHILS, CENTER AND PERIPHERY: Es-
SAYS IN MACRO SOCIOLOGY 164-82 (1975)). 
54 See generally Wai, supra note 20. 
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and ethnic diversity exists in many other countries. 55 But the Af-
rican continent is unique in its breadth of diversity. The conti-
nent is home to hundreds of ethnic groups speaking over 800 
languages.56 With very rare exceptions, most of these states con-
tain numerous ethnic groups which came to live together within 
the same country only as a result of colonial fiat. 57 Before coloni-
alism, they at best enjoyed little or no contact. At worst, they 
were hostile. 
Ethnicity tends to be more important to Africans than it is to 
individuals elsewhere. In much of Africa, ethnicity is the hub 
around which life revolves. The more important aspects of an 
individual's life are determined by rules emanating from the indi-
vidual's ethnic group. 58 Though a subject of the state, it is often 
the individual's membership in the ethnic group that he consid-
ers more important. · Consequently, the ethnic group in Africa 
constitutes an important "semi-autonomous social field."59 
2. Ethnicity and Political Demands 
Ethnicity is prominent in the realm of politics as well. It now 
serves as a basis for articulating demands against the state.60 The 
civil wars in Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda, and 
the massacres between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda 
have all involved ethnicity and demands based on it. 
55 The world is inhabited by about 5000 ethnic groups. Anaya, supra note 21, at 
840. The number of independent states, by contrast, is approximately 176. /d. Only a 
handful of states, such as Ireland, Denmark, Japan, and Germany, are nearly homoge-
nous. Sharon O'Brien, Cultural Rights in the United States: A Conflict of Values, 5 LAw & 
INEQ.. J. 267, 268 n.2 (1987). In Africa only Somalia is homogenous. I. M. Lewis, The 
Nation, State, and Politics in Somalia, in THE SEARCH FoR NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 
285 (David R. Smock & Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill eds., 1976). Somali homogeneity is 
rooted in a common pastoral culture, a common language, and Islam. /d. Yet, all of 
these factors have proved to be incapable of preventing Somlia's decline into inter-clan 
animosity and warfare. 
56 CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 4. 
57 The modern political map of Africa is largely the creation of the nineteenth cen-
tury partition of the continent among European powers-a process that culminated in 
the Berlin Conference of 1854-85. See generally THE PARTITION OF AFRICA: ILLUSION OR 
NECESSITY? (Robert D. Collins ed., 1969) (describing the scramble for Africa). Ethiopia 
alone was able to avoid the full impact of this process, though it lost Eritrea, a name 
toined by the Italians to refer to the northern-most part of the country bordering on the 
Red Sea. 
58 See Gordon R. Woodman, Constitutions in a World of Powerful Semi-Autonomous Social 
Fields, 1989 THIRD WoRLD LEGAL STUD. l, 4-7. 
59 See id. at 4. The term "semi-autonomous" is from SALLY FALK MooRE, LAw AS 
PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 54-58 (1978). 
60 For an account of the various economic and political demands, see generally 
STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS: AFRICAN POLICY DILEMMAS, supra note 20. 
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From a constitutional perspective, these demands fall into two 
categories: demands for freedom from discrimination based on 
ethnic identity and demands for collective ethnic entitlement.61 
The first includes claims for non-discrimination and equal treat-
ment for members of an ethnic group as they seek to participate 
in the institutions and processes of the larger society.62 For ex-
ample, Liberia's indigenous population was denied its rights by a 
minority of American-Liberians who dominated the govern-
ment.63 The Hutus in Burundi and Tutsis in Rwanda have also 
faced severe discrimination.64 The second category of demands 
goes beyond nondiscrimination to embrace more radical claims 
ranging from efforts to preserve cultural identity and linguistic 
equality, to more aggressive claims for political autonomy. 65 
These radical demands have figured prominently in Ethiopia and 
Sudan.66 
3. Africa and the Two Classic Strategies for Ethnic Accommodation 
Ethnic and cultural diversity may be accommodated in either 
of two ways: assimilation or cultural pluralism.67 Assimilation is 
grounded in the principles of individual non-discrimination and 
equality and is manifested in a system of individual rights. The 
second approach draws support from a scheme of collective 
rights. 
African states, by and large, have historically followed the first 
model.68 Little in the African states' constitutions reflects the 
states' consciousness of their ethnic diversities and conflicts. 
Rarely has an African constitution recognized the collective 
rights of ethnic groups to maintain their culture, language, or au-
61 Anaya, supra note 21, at 837. 
62 !d. (nondiscrimination principle embedded in Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, International Human Rights Covenants, and International Covenant on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination). See also Asbjorn Eide, Minority Situa-
tions: In Search of Peaceful and Constructive Solutions, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1311, 1333-36 
( 1991) (noting the "paramount importance" of nondiscrimination and full participation 
of all individuals as a means for avoiding ethnic conflicts). 
63 See Warren Weinstein, Africa, in PROTECTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES: CoMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVES 208, 214 (Robert G. Wirsing ed., 1981 ). 
64 See id. at 216. 
65 Anaya, supra note 21, at 838. 
66 See generally supra notes 19-20. 
67 O'Brien, supra note 55, at 268. 
68 Shivji, supra note 11, at 389 (noting that the assimilationist tendency in Africa has 
been so strong that it has destroyed even "the relatively voluntary unions" found be-
tween the former Zanzibar and Tanganyika) .. 
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tonomy.69 The lack of recognition has persisted even in those 
countries that have experienced disastrous civil wars originating 
from ethnic grievances. 70 
Why have African states persisted in their reluctance to go 
beyond the discourse of individual rights? Two factors are pri-
marily responsible: the influence of liberal constitutionalism fo-
cusing on individual rights, and the tendency of African states to 
view ethnic diversity as "a burden and an evil to be obliter-
ated,"71 rather than a factor to be accommodated as a valued as-
pect of nationhood. 
B. The Influence of Liberal Constitutionalism 
Liberal constitutionalism has held sway in Africa at and since 
the time ofindependence.72 The colonial governments had little 
69 /d. There have been a few exceptions, however, at least on paper. Article 3 of 
Benin's constitution provides: 
The People's Republic of Benin is a unified multinational state. All nationali-
ties are equal in rights and duties. Consolidating and developing their union is 
a sacred duty of the State, which shall assure to each one a full development in 
unity through a just policy toward nationalities and an inter-regional bal-
ance .... All nationalities shall be free to use their spoken and written language 
and to develop their own culture. 
BENIN CoNST. ch. I, art. III (1977), reprinted in II CoNSTITUTIONS oF THE CouNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990). See also ETHIOPIA 
CoNST. art. II (1987), reprinted in V CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES OF THE WoRLD 
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990). 
Ultimately, these guarantees have been empty. Both Benin and Ethiopia have 
sought to channel all activities of national life according to the norms set by Marxism-
Leninism, with its system of one-party domination. This has not proven to be a hospita-
ble climate for a multi-ethnic society. 
A more serious public commitment seems to be apace in Namibia. In 1990 Namibia 
adopted a constitution which declares: 
Every person shall be entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote 
any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms of this Consti-
tution and further subject to the condition that the rights protected by this 
Article do not impinge upon the rights of others or the national interest. 
NAMIBIA CoN ST. ch. III, art. XIX ( 1990), reprinted in XI CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES 
OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990). For an early assess-
ment of this provision see Lynn Berat, The Future of Customary Law in Namibia: A Call for an 
Integration Model, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1, 29 (1991) (suggesting that 
Namibia adopt an integration approach, because "[i]ntegration is a juridical halfway 
house between pluralism and uniformity"). 
70 The Sudan is the preeminent example. The Arab North's imposition of Sharia 
law and its unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, which had 
granted the people of the South a measure of self-government, reversed the modest 
advances made in dealing with ethnic grievances. See An-Na'im, supra note 52, at 105-12. 
71 Shivji, supra note 11, at 389; see also Clay, supra note 44, at 2 (discussing African 
states' efforts to "eliminate" ethnic and cultural identity). 
72 See Filip Reyntjens, Authoritarianism for Francophone Africa From the Colonial to the 
Post-Colonial State, 1988 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 59, 75 ("As a ticket for access to 
statehood the possession of a constitution was necessary but not sufficient: it had to be 
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use for this principle, denying the African peoples their funda-
mental rights and freedoms. 73 But at the end of the colonial era, 
the colonial powers conditioned the African states' independence 
on the acceptance of liberal constitutions.74 The African nations 
were not necessarily opposed to the values of liberal constitu-
tionalism. Many African nationalist leaders were versed in these 
values,75 having used the moral precepts ofliberal constitutional-
ism to embarrass the colonists for their denial of human rights to 
the colonized.76 Whether by imposition or by choice, the consti-
tutions of independent African states proclaimed their allegiance 
to principles which they considered components of liberal de-
mocracy, such as racial equality and the freedoms of speech, as-
sociation, and assembly. · 
Liberal constitutionalism is concerned only with individual 
rights, specifically the relationship between the individual and 
the state.77 Viewed in its own contractarian te.rms, this relation-
ship consists of two basic understandings between the parties. 
First, the relationship is about individual rights, which in turn set 
limits on the rights of others, such as those in the majority or 
those holding political power. 78 Second, these rights are guaran-
teed by the state to individuals. 79 Therefore, the state's role and 
duty is to protect individual rights. 
liberal-democratic as well if one was to be taken seriously by other members of the 
club"); see also Robert B. Seidman, Constitutions in Anglophonic Sub-saharan Africa: Form and 
Legitimacy, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 83, 94. 
7!1 During the colonial period, the colonial powers were "authoritarian to the core." 
Robert B. Seidman, judicial Review and Fundamental Freedoms in Anglophonic Independent Af 
rica, 35 OHIO ST. LJ. 820,820 (1974). The colonial powers justified the denial of funda-
mental rights and freedoms to their African subjects on the convenient theory that they 
were "naturally unequal to Europeans." Dunstan M. Wai, Human Rights in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 115, 118 (Adaman-
tia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979). The powers were thus able to keep down the 
African population and thwart any form of political opposition. 
74 See SEIDMAN, supra note 16, at 379. 
75 Some Africans had studied abroad in Europe and America. Wai, supra note 73, at 
118. Others were products of missionary schools at home. !d. Indeed, some African 
leaders such as Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory 
Coast, and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal had been active in French government. 
ALI A. MAZRUI & MICHAEL TIDY, NATIONALISM AND NEW STATES IN AFRICA 21, 78, 91-92 
(1984). These leaders had become assimilated persons through France's tendency to-
ward "macro-integration." See id. at 382. 
76 See Wai, supra note 73, at 119. 
77 See Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 
ARIZ. L. REv. 739, 740 (1990); see also Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral 
Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. PoL. 21 ( 1982). 
78 Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individual-
ism, 4 CAN.j. L. &JuR. 217,221 (1991). 
79 /d. 
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Consequently, liberal constitutionalism fails to account for 
the rights of ethnic or cultural communities.8° Founded on the 
uncompromising duality of the individual and the state, it lacks 
any regard for any other actors on the social and political stage.81 
In other words, the state regards ethnicity with the same detach-
ment as it does religion: with "benign neutrality."82 This view 
considers ethnicity a private matter in which the state has no 
business. While the state will protect an individual from ethnic 
discrimination and ensure the individual's freedom to preserve 
his or her ethnic identity or heritage it will not affirmatively nur-
ture ethnic affiliations, nor honor claims of entitlement based on 
ethnic identity alone.83 
This vision of constitutionalism animated African states at the 
time of independence and has since remained the dominant vi-
sion.84 The troubled history of constitution-making in Nigeria il-
lustrates the ideological influence of this vision. When Nigerian 
politicians met in a constitutional conference in 1958, smaller 
ethnic groups widely feared domination by the majority. 85 These 
80 See supra note 77; see also RoGER M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 47-49 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PuB. AFF. 107, 171-72 (1976) (individual rights theories cannot account for affirmative 
action policies). 
81 Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 
1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 119; see also Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights 
of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1013-14 (1983). 
82 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity, 4 CAN. J. L. & JuR. 239, 
241 (1991). 
83 In a liberal society "the state sets before itself the model that group membership 
is purely private, a shifting matter of personal choice and degree, something that may be 
weakened and dissolved as other identities take over .... " Nathan Glazer, Individual 
Rights Against Group Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS 87, 98 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice E. Tay 
eds., 1978). The judicial tradition of the United States, as in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954}, illustrates this approach. The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tions of the equal protection clause and other constitutional guarantees continue to 
perpetuate a vision of an American society committed to tolerance of cultural and ethnic 
diversity. See generally Karst, supra note 25, for an analysis of the ways in which the Court 
used these constitutional guarantees to foster diversity and tolerance. 
84 See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text; see also Shivji, supra note 11, at 382-
83. Independence constitutions in Africa followed three general patterns. The Nigerian 
model, followed in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Siera Leone, "contain[ed] an 
elaborate charter of human rights, spelled out in precise legal terms." Asante, supra note 
12, at 74-75. The Chadian model, followed by most Francophone countries, proclaimed 
"in general terms its attachment to the principles set forth in the Declaration of Rights of 
Man of 1789, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948." /d. at 75. The 
Ghanian model "did not incorporate a Bill of Rights in the usual sense; nor was any institu-
tion set up to protect the rights of the ordinary citizen." Id. at 75 (emphasis in original). 
85 See S. A. DE SMITH, THE NEw CoMMONWEALTH AND ITs CoNSTITUTIONS 178 
( 1964); see also Moses E. Akpan, The 1979 Nigerian Constitution and Human Rights, UNIVER-
SAL HuM. RTS., Apr.-June 1980, at 23, 27; B. 0. NwABUEZE, A CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF NIGERIA 151 (1982). 
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smaller groups argued for the creation of new federated regions 
as the sole effective means to guarantee their interests.86 In re-
sponse, the British colonial administration set up a commission 
to inquire into the minority ethnic groups' fears and to consider 
ways to allay them.87 Although the commission's proposal that 
fundamental individual rights serve as a guarantee of equality 
and non-discrimination met with an unenthusiastic response, the 
commission nonetheless recommended the constitutional en-
trenchment of individual rights instead of the creation of new re-
gions for minorities.88 
These constitutional guarantees proved ineffective in protect-
ing minorities.89 That the government in a heterogeneous na-
tion-particularly one that is severely divided along ethnic 
lines-will respond with benign neutrality is a heroic assump-
tion.90 In many African nations a particular ethnic group domi-
nates or is identified with the government. This dominance calls 
into question the impartiality of public institutions.91 Only after 
a bloody civil war and a series of civil riots did the Nigerian gov-
ernment consider constitutional modifications aimed at guaran-
teeing individual rights and reflecting the nation's ethnic and 
cu'Itural diversity through various means, including the creation 
of separate regions for minority groups.92 
The assumption of a benignly neutral liberal constitution, 
moreover, is undercut in those nations in which a particular eth-
nic group's language is accorded sole official recognition.93 
86 DE SMITH, supra note 85, at 178. 
87 /d.; Akpan, supra note 85, at 28; NWABUEZE, supra note 85, at 151. 
88 DE SMITH, supra note 85, at 178. 
89 NWABUEZE, supra note 85, at 151. 
90 The liberal constitutional model also posits a "value neutral state": a state which 
takes no sides in social conflict and serves as a "neutral tool" for carrying out the poli-
cies of the government of the day. Seidman, supra note 8, at 59-60, 64. This is not, 
however, altogether realistic. /d. The neutral state thesis also assumes that making citi-
zens virtuous is not an appropriate role of the state. RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 191-205 (1985). The agitation for "family values" by the Republican Party 
during the 1992 U.S. election, however, belied the value-neutrality of the state. 
91 See HOROWITZ, supra note 28, at 193-94; see also Clay, supra note 44, at 4 (noting 
that the distribution of development aid demonstrates domination of most African states 
by one or two ethnic groups); Young, supra note 31, at 85. 
92 For an analysis of Nigeria's struggle to accommodate ethnic diversity, see Larry 
Diamond, Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic, 86 AFR. AFF. 209 
( 1987); Rotimi Timothy Suberu, Federalism and Nigeria's Political Future: A Comment, 87 
AFR. AFF. 431 ( 1988). 
93 In many countries language is viewed as a "symbol of domination." For exam-
ple, the Assames in India, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and the Moors in Mauritania have 
demanded that their languages be given exclusive official status as an authoritative ac-
knowledgment of their claim to greater respect. HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 219-20. 
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Other ethnic groups may plausibly claim that the state is partially 
establishing an official culture in public administration and edu-
cation.94 Language, after all, is a powerful means of assimila-
tion.95 By failing to provide protections for other languages, the 
state contributes to their eventual demise and the cultural heri-
tage embedded in them. Consequently, in several countries in 
Africa, including Ethiopia, Mauritania, and the Sudan, minority 
ethnicities have demanded linguistic equality and cultural 
autonomy.96 
C. The Need to Build a Nation 
At the time of their independence from European colonial-
ism, most African states lacked coherence. The colonial state 
structures inherited by the new nations did not displace indige-
nous social, cultural, and political institutions. A large portion of 
African peoples' loyalty to their particularist ethnic groups sur-
passed their allegiance to the state. Thus, many African leaders 
were apprehensive that ethnic loyalties would prove divisive and 
seriously threaten the viability of their fledgling states.97 
Consequently, uniting and assimilating into one nation the 
medley of ethnic communities within the post-colonial artificial 
state borders became an urgent necessity.98 As the Swiss experi-
ence demonstrates, cultural diversity is not necessarily incompat-
ible with a common national identity. Nevertheless, African 
governments, believing that multiple cultures and languages fos-
ter divided loyalties and a sense of separateness, have too fre-
quently assumed that nation-building requires supplanting the 
individual's ethnic and other particularist ties.99 Thus, they have 
94 Kymlicka, supra note 82, at 242 (noting liberal theory difficulty in reconciling 
official languages with "'benign neutrality'"). Several commentators have called for 
greater protection of linguistic minorities in the United States. See, e.g., Bill Piatt, Toward 
Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REv. 885 ( 1986); Kathryn]. 
Zoglin, Recognizing a Human Right to Language in the United States, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 
15 (1989). This call has been especially prompted by the advocacy for and adoption of 
"English only" legislation in the United States to preclude what some view as the " 'ero-
sion of the use of the English language.' " Zoglin, supra at 16. 
95 Karst, supra note 25, at 351 (noting that "[t)he adoption of English as a primary 
language is ... one measure of assimilation into the larger American society"). 
96 Weinstein, supra not.e 63, at 216. 
97 See Asante, supra note 12, at 83-84. 
98 !d. (discussing the "herculean" efforts to forge new nations on the fragile foun-
dation of ethnic diversity); Minasse Haile, Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Af-
rica: Some Observations on Concept and Reality, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 575, 594-595 ( 1984). 
99 See Asante, supra note 12, at 83-84. In many parts of Africa, "tribalism was con-
sidered a scourge, even traitorous, and it became an invective to be referred to as a 
tribalist.'' Wani, supra note 32, at 633. 
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considered it imperative to adopt common national languages 
and to discourage ethnic affiliations. 100 To this end, many Afri-
can states have adopted and promoted the use of European lan-
guages as their national language. 101 In a similar vein, African 
governments have retained the colonial legal systems, with little 
or no sensitivity for African culture and legal institutions. 102 
It should not be surprising that the use of ethnicity as a 
source of collective claims against the state would be considered 
radical, if not heretical. A group rights approach would preserve 
ethnic differences and cultural diversity where the modem Afri-
can state has upheld national unity and encouraged assimilation 
and homogeneity. African states have refused to consider minor-
ity rights as anything other than claims to equality and nondis-
crimination. 103 A guarantee of individual rights safeguards such 
enumerated rights as equality under the law regardless of ethnic-
ity. But it does not safeguard the rights of minorities qua minori-
ties to share political power or to preserve their identities, 
customs, and traditions. Protection of these rights requires a 
group rights approach. However, giving implicit legitimacy to 
group identity and loyalty that is less than national in scope 
would startle many African governments wedded to the ideology 
of nation-building. 104 
This misguided approach to nation-building has led to unfor-
tunate results. First, pursuing the goal of nationhood has re-
sulted in perpetuating the colonial subordination of African 
cultures and languages. If continued, it may eventually lead to 
the extinction of indigenous languages and cultures. Second, 
this policy has already resulted in the loss of millions of lives, 
dislocation of economic and social structures, and severe envi-
ronmental degradation. Although the various ethnic conflicts in 
Africa are not always or completely attributable to the pursuit of 
100 Wani, supra note 32, at 631. 
101 !d. Recently there has been outspoken, nonviolent dissent to these policies. For 
example, Sembene Ousmane, one of Francophone Africa's greatest artists, decries the 
failure of the Senegalese government to promote the use of national languages in 
schools. See Firinne Ni Chreachain, 'If I Were a Woman, I'd Never Marry an African,· 91 
ArR. Arr. 241, 241-42 (1992). 
102 Wani, supra note 32, at 631. 
103 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
104 Some have questioned the value of nation-building itself. For example, Wood-
man states that "[i]t is not always clear what is the intrinsic or instrumental value attrib-
uted to nation-building, nor whether it has any objectives other than the enhancement 
of the power of those who control the state, and the advancement of modes of produc-
tion from which they primarily benefit." Woodman, supra note 58, at 16-17. 
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this policy, fear of ethnic domination and the desire of ethnic 
groups to maintain their identities have spawned many such eth-
nic conflicts. 
Finally, single-minded focus on nation-building has jeopard-
ized the values underlying liberal constitutionalism itself. In the-
ory, constitutionalism envisions the state in culturally neutral 
terms. 105 As the experiences of countries such as the United 
States demonstrate, individual identification with the nation is 
not an ali-or-nothing proposition. The Equal Protection Clause 
and other substantive guarantees allow the individual to belong 
to the nation, while protecting his or her need to identify with an 
ethnic community. 106 
In much of Africa, however, government preoccupation with 
nation-building has often led to little or no concern for the values 
of constitutionalism. Despite ringing constitutional affirmations 
of basic human rights, the process of nation-building treated 
human rights as a mere luxury. 107 For example, a state would 
curtail any freedoms of speech and association used to advance 
particularistic interests or disrupt national unity. 108 Indeed, fear 
of politicized ethnicity eventually led to the widespread adoption 
of single-party or military governance in order to cope with the 
problem of ethnic fragmentation and the crisis of national 
integration. 109 
Some countries had a narrow vision of constitutionalism from 
the start. These states' constitutions restricted the freedoms they 
purported to guarantee so as to forestall ethnic demands. For 
example, the Guinea Constitution makes any "regionalist propa-
ganda" punishable. 110 The Congo Constitution contains a simi-
lar provision. 111 In sum, the influence of liberal 
constitutionalism and the mission of nation-building in Africa 
have worked in tandem. Both purport to view the state as cultur-
ally neutral. Both make the assertion of collective ethnic claims 
against the state impossible. A genuinely liberal state would par-
tially accommodate the preservation of ethnic identity at least as 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 80-83. 
106 Karst, supra note 25, at 337. 
107 See, e.g., Asante, supra note 12, at 83. 
108 !d. at 86. 
109 See Haile, supra note 98, at 594. 
ItO GuiNEA CoNST. art. 13 (1958), reprinted in VI CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES 
OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1985). 
II I CONGO CoNST. art. 11 (1979), reprinted in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES 
OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz. eds., 1989). 
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a private matter. But in Africa, where welding a conglomeration 
of ethnic groups into one nation continues to assume over-
whelming importance, states view ethnicity with hostility. 112 
The reemergence of ethnic identity and separatism and the 
vast democratic changes occurring in the world, however, no 
longer permit the state to continue treating ethnicity with hostil-
ity. These changes challenge the continued viability of the na-
tion-state as a unit of political organization. 113 Ethnic groups 
that do not dream of coexistence cannot survive as a state, 114 
much less become "one nation, indivisible." African constitu-
tion-makers must consider carefully the extent to which they can 
accommodate their diverse ethnic communities not just through 
the guarantee of individual rights, but also by addressing the spe-
cial demands of ethnic communities. 
Ill. SHOULD AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN RECOGNIZE 
CoLLECTIVE ETHNic CLAIMs? 
As discussed, the ideology of nation-building in Africa does 
not officially recognize different ethnic groups existing within the 
state. Liberal constitutional theory is equally devoid of any con-
ceptual space for the rights of ethnic groups. 
The goal of national unity explains largely the ideology of na-
tion-building in Africa. In theory, both the importance and desir-
ability of this goal can· hardly be questioned. Also 
unquestionable is the importance of the principles of equality 
and nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of individual rights. 115 
Nevertheless, constitutional solicitude for certain collective eth-
nic claims is not necessarily incompatible with these goals. As-
similation is not the only path to realizing them. In fact, the 
policy of focusing on national unity to the exclusion of group 
rights may lead to violence and social discord, and fail to protect 
fundamental values that the recognition of collective ethnic 
claims would promote. 116 · 
As a basis for shaping African constitutions, the assimilation-
ist model, based on liberal constitutionalism, 117 has serious limi-
tations. Understanding these limitations reqmres an 
112 See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 209. 
11!1 Magnet, supra note 21, at 171. 
114 /d. at 176. 
115 Eide, supra note 62, at 1334. 
116 For a discussion of these values, see infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text. 
117 Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HuM. RTs. Q 368, 371 (1991). 
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examination of liberalism's discord with the notion of collective 
rights. Identifying the sources of this discord will clarify the is-
sues and concerns that a different approach to constitution-mak-
ing in Africa must address. 
A. Liberal opposition to Ethnic Claims 
Many factors explain liberal constitutionalism's opposition to 
recognition of ethnic claims. For our purposes here, a discussion 
of the four major ones is sufficient. 
1. "Methodological Individualism" 
The most formidable objection to the notion of collective 
rights is what one author refers to as "methodological individual-
ism." 118 This philosophical objection is rooted in the thoughts of 
Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and, more recently, Rawls. 119 The es-
sence of this objection comes from liberalism's focus on the rela-
tionship between the individual and the state. 120 The liberal 
democratic tradition pits the individual against the state. 121 In 
Rawls's latest formulation, individuals alone are the "self-
originating sources of valid claims," the ultimate units of moral 
worth, and the ultimate agents of action. 122 Consequently, the 
community has no moral existence and cannot be the source of 
any valid claims against the state. 123 
Egalitarianism, another tenet of liberalism, provides an addi-
tional reason to deny collective rights. Because all individuals 
have an equal moral status, all must be treated with "equal con-
cern and respect." 124 According to liberal theory, if all individu-
als are treated equally, without regard to their communities, the 
communities need not have distinctive rights of their own. 125 
Thus, under principles of individualism and egalitarianism, 
118 Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 630 (1992). 
119 Clinton, supra note 77, at 740-41. 
120 /d.; Gedicks, supra note 81, at I 00 ("American liberalism, with its uncompromis-
ing focus on state and individual, often overlooks institutions like religious groups that 
are neither governmental nor individualistic"). 
121 See Clinton, supra note 77, at 740. 
122 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Individualism and Minority Rights, LAw AND THE CoMMU· 
NITY 181, 184 (A. C. Hutchinson & Leslie M. Green eds., 1989). 
123 /d. ("There seems to be no room within the moral ontology of liberalism for the 
idea of collective rights.") Therefore, the concept of collective rights is a "metaphysical 
absurdity." Addis, supra note 118, at 631. 
124 Kymlicka, supra note 122, at 184. 
125 /d. 
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the only "true" constitution is one which disregards ethnicity or 
race. Collective ethnic rights have no place in a liberal constitu-
tional order. 126 
2. Balkanization of the State 
On a pragmatic level, liberalism assumes that official recogni-
tion of different ethnic groups would hamper a society's integra-
tion and assimilation. 127 Cultural and linguistic differences are a 
threat to the nation because diversity limits the nation's unity and 
its government's effectiveness. As an American federal court 
stated, 
Effective action by the nation-state rises to its peak of 
strength only when it is in response to aspirations unre-
servedly shared by each constituent culture and language 
group. As affection which a culture or group bears toward 
a particular aspiration abates, and as the scope of sharing 
diminishes, the strength of the nation-state's government 
wanes. 128 
Furthermore, opponents of collective rights worry that the at-
tribution of rights to ethnic groups will constrain the free flow of 
goods, capital, labor, 129 and even ideas. In Nigeria, for example, 
a policy of "Northernization" 130 sought to exclude individuals 
from the south of the country from equal participation in the 
economy and government of the north. Under this policy, Ibos 
(southerners) were barred from operating hotels and working 
under contract for the government and even private enter-
prises.131 It is also feared that collective rights may reinforce eth-
nic identities, making political cooperation and consensus harder 
to achieve. 132 
3. Apartheid and Associated Evils 
Liberals also fear that official recognition of collective rights 
may represent the first step down a dangerous road. They asso-
ciate, in part, recognition of collective rights with South Africa's 
126 /d. 
127 Glazer, supra note 83, at 98. 
128 Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No.3, 587 F.2d 1022, 
1027 (9th Cir. 1978). 
129 Sanders, supra note 117, at 375. 
130 B. 0. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 130 (1973). 
131 !d. 
132 Sanders, supra note 117, at 3 7 5. 
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system of apartheid and tribal homelands. 133 Under such a sys-
tem, the notion of a common citizenship or equal protection of 
the law is meaningless because all rights flow from and are deter-
mined by an individual's membership in a particular ethnic 
group. By definition rights are for members only, so non-mem-
bers are likely to face open and invidious discrimination. 134 
Moreover, liberals are concerned that the individual might be 
"run over by the collective steamroller." 135 Within a system of 
collective rights, the risk exists that individual rights will be sacri-
ficed for the good of the community. Finally, opponents of col-
lective rights fear that recognition of such rights may lead to 
expulsions of non-members of an ethnic community. 
4. Translatability or Redundancy of Collective Rights 
A final argument against collective rights questions their ne-
cessity. The argument assumes that individual rights adequately 
protect and promote the values that would underlie any collec-
tive rights. 136 This argument implicitly assumes that collective 
rights are "translatable" into individual rights. 137 
The above arguments against recognizing group claims ap-
pear forceful. It might thus seem incautious to suggest that con-
stitution-makers incorporate ethnic claims in the constitutional 
order of African states. However, several arguments support 
such incorporation. 
B. The Case for Collective Rights 
One can approach the case for collective rights from two an-
gles. The first questions the theoretical and practical assump-
tions underlying liberal constitutionalism. The second provides 
affirmative reasons for protecting certain collective rights. Both 
approaches underscore the importance and value of community 
to African existence. 
133 See Addis, supra note 118, at 632. 
134 [A]s the founders of modern liberalism well understood, when a govern· 
ment undertakes actively to promote through law and public policies a distinc· 
tive "way of life," it inevitably impinges on the sense of equal treatment and 
equal participation of those minorities who are not part of the community and 
who do not share in their sense of collective good. 
F. L. Morton, Group Rights Versus Individual Rights in the Charter: The Special Cases of Natives 
and the Q}tebecois, in MINORITIES AND THE CANADIAN STATE 71, 81 (Neil Nevitte & Allan 
Kornberg eds., 1985). 
135 McDonald, supra note 78, at 227. 
136 /d. at 229. 
137 Garet, supra note 81, at 1007. 
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1. The Limitations of Methodological Individualism 
Liberalism's essential premise that the individual is the ulti-
mate and sole unit of moral worth is not self-evident. Why 
should the individual be the focal point? Should constitutional-
ism instead protect the ethnic community without which the indi-
vidual would cease to be human? The following passage 
captures the deontologist conception of this unattached, isolated, 
self-interested individual: 
Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanction of so-
cial roles, the deontological self is installed as sovereign, 
cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. 
As inhabitants of a world without telos, we are free to con-
struct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of 
value antecedently given. . . . And as independent selves, 
we are free to choose our purposes and ends uncon-
strained by such an order, or by custom or tradition or 
inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our con-
ceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, sim-
ply in virtue of our having chosen them. 138 
Under this conception, the individual exists prior to and inde-
pendently of any experience in community. But to Africans and 
others in the non-Western world, this conception is strange and 
counterintuitive. 139 Africans see themselves as social beings for 
whom memberships in the extended family, clan, and ethnic 
group are crucial to the recognition of individual rights. 140 The 
"sacralized individual" of methodological individualism that sin-
gle-handedly strikes a social compact with the state is difficult to 
find within the African conception of rights.l 41 Rules of law 
springing from group contexts characterize the social order in 
much of Africa. 142 In addition, traditional legality in Africa in-
138 MICHAELj. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF jUSTICE 177 (1982). 
139 Clinton, supra note 77. 
140 Claude E. Welch, Jr., Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa, in HuMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 11, 15-16 (Claude E. Welch & Ronald I. Meltzer 
eds., 1984) (noting that African social systems emphasize rights deriving from group 
membership); see generally GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 14-
23 ( 1991) (discussing the relationship between the individual and the community in 
Africa). 
141 Asmarom Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERA-
TIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123, 124 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1980) ("No aspect of 
Western civilization makes an African more uncomfortable than the concept of the 
sacralized individual whose private wars against society are celebrated"). 
142 Woodman, supra note 58, at 1. Clinton, supra note 77, at 742 (noting that non-
Westerners derive their legal vision from their tribal associations, tribal traditions and 
the natural ecology). 
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volved more than issues between the individual and the group or 
the state. It more often addressed issues between groups within 
the state. 143 The liberal vision of the individual's precedence 
over the community and existence in isolation from organized 
society in some mythic, disorganized state of nature inappropri-
ately describes African reality and understanding of the source of 
rights. 
One need not be an African to doubt the plausibility of meth-
odological individualism as a norm or means of description. Mis-
givings abound even in the West. Without discounting the 
importance of individual rights, Ronald Garet has offered an in-
sightful analysis of an "intrinsic value theory" of groups. 144 He 
justifies all rights-individual, group, and social--on the basis of 
existence. 145 He defines existence as the "human mode of be-
ing" with three structures essential to a human being and charac-
teristic of the intrinsic human good: personhood (the individual 
good), communality (the group good), and sociality (the social 
good). 146 Existence, he says, "carries its own moral value (i.e., 
the intrinsic good) and insists upon that value in the form of the 
right." 147 Each structure of existence exemplifies an intrinsic 
good and establishes a basis for rights. 
To establish communality as a structure of existence, Garet 
relies upon an obvious fact that methodological individualism 
overlooks: 
Not only is· groupness an unfathomable fact of all of our 
lives, but it is also an unfathomable value. We are born 
into certain groups, others we choose, and still others 
choose us. Life not subject to the call of groupness is as 
. difficult for us to imagine as life not subject to the individ-
uating call of personhood or to the sociating call of 
sociality. 148 
The renewed ethnic militancy and the reassertion of group rights 
in many parts of the world, including Western countries such as 
Canada and Spain, confirms that groupness is an "unfathomable 
fact" and an "unfathomable value." Given these realities, it is 
odd, if not downright arbitrary, to insist on personhood as the 
only structure of existence for which rights are essential. 
143 Asante, supra note 12, at 100. 
144 Garet, supra note 81, at 1001. 
145 !d. at 1002. 
146 !d. 
147 /d. 
148 /d. at 1070. 
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The practical effect of insistence on personhood alone is 
group destruction. Ethnic groups seek the right of self-presenta-
tion, "the right of groups to maintain themselves and to pursue 
their distinctive courses."149 By focusing exclusively on the indi-
vidual, liberalism compels assimilation. Some may defend assim-
ilation as an indispensable first step toward treating all 
individuals equally, irrespective of membership in a cultural or 
ethnic group. 150 However, ethnic groups do not seek merely the 
right of the individual members to equality and participation 
within the larger society. They also seek group security and sur-
vival, because assimilation threatens to destroy their group and 
their members' individual integrity. A community's integrity is 
threatened when the community is unable to. sustain the lan-
guage, culture, history, and traditions that are the sources of its 
existence. Without community integrity, it is difficult to achieve 
individual integrity. Thus, collective rights are needed to pre-
serve individual identity as well as group identity. 
One may argue that official recognition is unnecessary for 
ethnic group self-preservation, for as long as the national gov-
ernment preserves its neutrality, each group is free to maintain 
itself in its own ways. But a government's purported neutrality 
cannot be assumed. In many nations, the government's neutral-
ity is questionable when it· is often identified with the culture of 
one or more dominant ethnic communities. 151 Moreover, it is 
difficult to reconcile a state's supposed benign neutrality with re-
gard to particular cultures with the recognition of an official lan-
guage.152 Therefore when a state uses a particular language for 
official purposes such as education and administrative services, it 
also partially establishes a corresponding culture and casts doubt 
on its claim of neutrality. 153 
The premise of state neutrality also conceals the uneven play-
ing field for dominant and minority cultures. 154 ·The state pur-
ports to be neutral but, from the start, politically dominant 
149 See id. at 1002. Yoram Dinstein· maintains that "two collective human rights are 
accorded by general international law to every minority anywhere: the right to physical 
existence and the right to preserve a separate identity." Yoram Dinstein, Collective 
Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q 102, 118 (1976). 
150 See Addis, supra note 118, at 634. 
151 The Amhara-Tigre coalition in Ethiopia, the American-Liberians in Liberia, and 
the Arabs in the Sudan, Mauritania, and Zanzibar illustrate this phenomenon in Africa. 
152 !d. at 242; see also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text; infra notes 217·218 
and accompanying text. 
153 See Karst, supra note 25, at 351-52. 
154 See Sanders, supra note 117, at 373. 
28 STANFORD jOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29:1 
cultures have an inherent advantage. As a result, dominant 
groups can outvote or outbid minority cultures for the resources 
necessary for the latter's survival. 155 Thus, minority groups con-
stantly face the threat of cultural extinction. The dominant 
group's refusal to effectively protect group rights essential to the 
minority's self-preservation, if not intentionally, favors assimila-
tion and therefore group destruction. 
2. Collective Rights and Fear of Negative Consequences 
To be sure, one cannot lightly dismiss the risk that recogni-
tion of collective rights might result in balkanization of the state, 
accentuation of ethnic differences, and even the denial of individ-
ual rights. These concerns trouble all Africans who care about 
the unity of their countries and the welfare of their inhabitants. 
Yet, recognition of certain collective rights is a practical neces-
sity, not a theoretical luxury. 156 
Following traditional nation-building ideas, 157 most African 
governments have ignored, sought to suppress, or even obliter-
ated ethnic differences. 158 These attempts to disregard ethnicity, 
however, have failed and led instead to ethnic resentment, disaf-
fection, resistance, and political disorder-the obverse of 
nationhood. 
A political order's legitimacy and stability rest largely on gov-
ernment's ability to persuade the governed that it shares and rep-
resents their ethnic identities. 159 Unity and the social compact 
depend on how strongly the people feel about the state and gov-
ernment.160 Forced assimilation in multi-ethnic societies is un-
155 Kymlicka, supra note 122, at 196; Addis, supra note 118, at 643. 
156 See Sanders, supra note 11 7, at 3 7 5-76. 
157 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
158 See Shivji, supra note 11, at 388 ("Many African constitutions vigorously con-
demn, outlaw, make treasonable and frown upon any expression of nationality 
consciousness"). 
159 This is implicit in what John Stuart Mill indicated long ago is prerequisite to a 
liberal democratic state: 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different na-
tionalities. Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and 
speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working 
of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which form opin-
ions and decide political acts are different in the different sections of the coun-
try. . . . [I]t is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the 
boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of 
nationalities. 
jOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 230, 232-33 
(1958). 
160 See Guadalupe, 587 F.2d at 1037. 
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likely to foster positive feelings. Groups facing assimilation 
perceive it as an affront because it denies them social recogni-
tion. A group's demand to maintain its language and culture is 
an assertion of the worth of its people and their collective self-
esteem. Ethnic groups resist assimilation because its inherent 
precept of equal protection of the law focuses only on interper-
sonal equality, 161 whereas ethnic groups seek intergroup equal-
ity. Collective rights will ensure such equality, which, in tum, will 
nurture the feelings required to establish political stability and 
governmental legitimacy. 
Admittedly, recognition of collective rights to preserve the 
unity of the state requires fusion of different ethnicities and cul-
tures. But given the realities of much of Africa, 162 the alternative 
is an all out war with no winner, for many ethnic groups are pow-
erful enough in their own right to dissolve the state order. More-
over, when political disorder occurs, everyone suffers the loss of 
whatever modicum of individual rights the state recognizes. 
Harassed governments are not punctilious about rights or the 
rule of law even for members of dominant groups. 
Those opposing recognition of collective rights as a method 
of ethnic accommodation point to the United States as an exam-
ple of a country that is solicitous of individual rights but hostile 
to collective rights. 163 But holding out the United States as a 
model is misleading because there is a fundamental difference 
between the types of claims made by cultural and racial minori-
ties there and the claims of ethnic groups in Africa. 164 First, the 
demands of the most active racial minority, African-Americans, 
generally have not been incompatible with the goal of assimila-
tion. African-Americans have principally demanded not to be de-
nied the equal enjoyment of individual rights and equal 
participation in the institutions of the state and economy. 165 Af-
rican-Americans do not inhabit, nor seek to inhabit, a separate 
territory 166 or speak a different language. In contrast, many eth-
nic groups in Africa demand group self-preservation, not assimi-
lation. And unlike the United States, the typical African state is a 
161 See Caret, supra note 81, at 1058-60 (discussing the difficulty of basing group 
rights on the antidiscrimination principle). 
162 See supra notes 60 and 92 and accompanying text. 
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federation of peoples, each people maintaining a distinct terri-
tory, language, and culture. 
Moreover, aside from Native Americans and African-Ameri-
cans, ethnic groups in the United States are not considered enti-
tled to state recognition of their ethnicity, because immigration 
was not imposed upon them. Although this difference does not 
justify state imposition of the larger culture upon voluntary im-
migrant groups, it does suggest the state is not required to sup-
port ethnic institutions such as language and culture. In Africa, 
on the other hand, no particular group is justified in requiring 
conformity by all to its language or culture. If the description of 
the typical African state as a "federation of peoples" is correct, 
then the fundamental nature of the social order is in sync with 
and should give rise to a state's obligation to recognize some col-
lective rights. 
The argument that recognition of such rights will lead to the 
trappings of apartheid or will encourage a policy of tribal home-
lands misconstrues the purposes served by these policies. 
Apartheid, based on an ideology of racial supremacy, is designed 
to keep black South Africans in a permanent state of political 
subordination and economic exploitation. 167 The related policy 
of tribal homelands also maintains white supremacy by keeping 
blacks divided. The policies are neither rooted in, motivated by, 
nor related to respect for cultural differences. Collective rights, 
by contrast, are aimed at promoting group self-preservation and 
group equality, as well as including every group in the country's 
political life and economy. To equate collective rights with 
apartheid is to suggest that the constitutional systems of coun-
tries such as Canada and Switzerland 168 are similarly tainted. 
3. Nontranslatability of Collective Rights 
As noted, some critics deny the necessity and existence of col-
lective rights, arguing that collective rights are translatable into 
individual rights. According to this view, collective rights are 
merely "elliptical" ways to describe individual rights. 169 For ex-
ample, freedom of assembly and association are expressed in the 
167 Addis, supra note 118, at 632 n.50. 
168 For a brief discussion of the ways in which Canada protects cultural diversity, see 
Magnet, supra note 21. For a review of the manner in which Switzerland protects its 
national and linguistic groups, see generally, CAROL ScHMID, CoNFLICT AND CoNSENSUS 
IN SwiTZERLAND ( 1981). 
169 Garet, supra note 81, at 1037. 
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idiom of individual rights, but they cannot be exercised effec-
tively in isolation from other individuals or groups. 
The "translatability" theory, however, fails to address essen-
tial distinctions between individual and collective rights. Ronald 
Garet uses two U.S. Supreme Court decisions to illustrate the dif-
ficulties posed by attempting to translate collective rights into in-
dividual rights. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 170 the Court created a 
partial exemption to a s~ate compulsory schooling law. The rul-
ing prevented Wisconsin from prosecuting Amish parents who 
sought to preserve their community's traditional way of life by 
refusing to place their children in state schools.I 71 Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez 172 involved a Native American tribe. The 
Court, deferring to tribal autonomy, held that the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 173 did not create a federal .forum to review 
tribal legislation 174 that discriminated against a woman and her 
children in violation of the "equal protection of the laws" guar-
anteed by the Act. 175 As Garet explains: 
because there are certain things that only groups, and not 
individuals, can have--such as socialization processes 
(Yoder) and kinship structures (Santa Clara)-there are a 
fortiori certain things that only a group can hold a right to 
have. 176 
Garet argues that the rights the Court protected in these cases 
can be justified only in terms of "groupness" or "communal-
ity." 177 An individual rights analysis cannot plausibly explain 
these decisions. 178 In Santa Clara, the Court upheld a group right 
of the tribe against cultural erosion. 179 Respect for the individual 
right of the female member of the tribe would lead to granting 
rather than denying a federal forum. 180 Similarly, Justice Doug-
las stated in Yoder that the individual right to free choice would 
I 70 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
171 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36. 
172 436 u.s. 49 (1978). 
17!1 25 u.s.c. §§ 1301-03 (1988). 
174 Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 66, 72. 
175 "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws .... " 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) 
(1988). 
176 Garet, supra note 81, at 1038 (original emphasis). 
177 /d. at 1035. 
178 /d. at 1043-44. 
179 /d. at 1035 ("[T]he central drama of Santa Clara is whether a group, long sub-
jected to laws and social practices (first Spanish and then American) erosive of tribal 
groupness, can attempt to halt this sort of erosion by applying an internal control"). 
180 /d. at 1036. 
32 STANFORD jOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 29:1 
protect the Amish children's rights against their parents, rather 
than the parents' right to perpetuate a way of life without state 
intrusion. 181 This analysis suggests that collective rights are not 
translatable into individual rights, but rather are a distinct cate-
gory of rights. 
Consider the French-Canadians' concerns with preserving 
their language and culture. The guarantee of an individual right 
to express one's language and culture is inadequate without the 
protection of group rights. One cannot meaningfully exercise 
this right unless institutions exist enabling its enjoyment. Such 
institutions preserve, for example, the right to cultural auton-
omy, which addresses a group concern, not an individual one. It 
is in this sense that this Article discusses collective rights. 182 
181 /d. at 1032 (Douglas,J., dissenting in part) (citing 406 U.S. at 245-46). 
At the center of [the Yoder] picture is a group trying to protect its constitutive 
intrinsic value, its groupness. On one side stands the state, pressing claims 
based upon certain collective interests and upon the fundamental right of soci-
ety to be a society of equal shares. On the other side stand the Amish children, 
persons for whom the good of belonging in the Amish group is in some degree 
of tension with the good of free individual religious choice. 
!d. at 1034. 
182 For an elaborate statement of the distinction between group and individual 
rights, see W. S. Tarnopolsky, The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charier of Rights and 
Freedoms, 61 CAN. BAR REv. 242 (1983). Tarnopolsky sets forth two fundamental distinc-
tions between individual and collective rights: 
The first is that an assertion of an individual right emphasizes the proposition 
that everyone is to be treated the same regardless of his or her membership in a 
particular identifiable group. The assertion of group rights, on the other hand, 
bases itself upon a claim of an individual or a group of individuals because of 
membership in an identifiable group. This distinction should not be obscured 
by the fact that certain individual rights are either of no consequence unless 
enjoyed in community with others, or are asserted on behalf of individuals who 
happen to be members of identifiable minority groups. Thus, although it is irue 
that the fundamental freedoms of expression~ religion, assembly, and associa-
tion are intended to be exercised by several individuals in common or for the 
purpose of communication, the intention is that each of these freedoms is to be 
enjoyed equally by everyone. If one asserts the right to worship as one pleases 
within the law, this is asserted regardless of whether the person happens to be a 
Christian, a Jew, a Muslim or a Hindu. However, to the extent that certain 
rights of religion vary because of special protection for certain religious groups, 
such a right is no longer an individual right, but a group right. ... 
Certain rights, such as language rights, seem to lie in a borderland. When 
examined more closely, however, the distinction referred to above becomes 
clear. A guarantee of freedom of expression, for example, assures one the right 
to communicate, regardless of which language is used as the medium of com-
munication. It does not, however, give any assurance that the communication 
will be understood, nor that the reply, if there be any, will be in a language 
which the initiator of the communication will understand .... 
This leads to the second distinction between group rights and individual 
rights. The guarantee of an individual right like free expression essentially re-
quires the noninterference of the state. A language right[,] on the other hand, 
1992 Ethnic Identity 33 
To some, recognition of collective rights may suggest prefer-
ential treatment for groups, which is contrary to the ideal of 
equality. On the contrary, collective rights are intended to pro-
tect vulnerable ethnic groups from the onslaught of a culturally 
and politically dominant group. Individual rights cast in univer-
sal terms are not sufficient to ensure genuine equality. They can 
only integrate and assimilate these minority groups into the 
dominant group or help them achieve negative equality, such as 
freedom from state interference. This only grants minority 
groups a right to be poor imitations of the dominant group-not 
a right to preserve their own group identity. 183 
4. The Value of Collective Rights 
As Yoder and Santa Clara indicate, rights for the community are 
sometimes gained at the expense of individual rights. In those 
cases, the individual rights of the Amish children and the Pueblo 
woman directly conflicted with the collective interests of the 
Amish community and the Pueblo tribe. Nevertheless, advocates 
of the supremacy of individual rights may question the value of 
collective rights and be reluctant to endorse them. In Africa, 
where ethnic groupness is a fundamental feature of social exist-
ence, 184 many governments have disregarded and attempted to 
destroy ethnicity in the name of building nations which command 
absolute allegiance. 185 Ironically, an individual's definition, dig-
nity, and fulfillment all depend significantly on membership in a 
social group. 186 It is therefore disingenuous to suggest that indi-
vidual worth and dignity can be respected while obliterating the 
group find culture with which the individual identifies. 
requires positive governmental action. ll may be that the government is re-
quired to have civil servants who can comprehend the language of the citizen 
and reply in that language, or is required lO expend funds to provide instruc-
tion in the language to promote cultural activities which protect and promote 
the guaranteed language .... In a homogenes:>us country there is no need for 
constitutional protection for the language which is spoken by the people .... 
Language rights need constitutional guarantees only in those places where 
there are minorities who want lO safeguard a language other than that spoken 
by the majority of the country or the province, or where the majority language 
is threatened by the minority which is majority in the rest of the country. 
!d. at 259-60. 
183 See Addis, supra note 118, at 657. 
184 See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. 
186 See Magnet, supra note 21, at 176; see also Gedicks, supra note 81, at 116 (discuss-
ing the importance of groups as contexts for personal expression, development, and 
fulfillment). 
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Thus, "a principal value protected by a system of collective 
rights is the preservation of those institutions by which the group 
maintains itself." 187 Without these institutions, communities face 
threats to their integrity. And without group integrity, individual 
integrity and choice lose much of their meanings. 188 As Alasdair 
Macintyre noted, "The story of my life is always embedded in the 
story of those communities from which I derive my identity." 189 
Committed individualists may ignore the value of community, 
not only in terms of individual identity, but also in terms of fos-
tering true equality. Individuals belonging to groups whose cul-
tures are targeted for destruction cannot be truly the equal of 
those belonging to cultures that do not face such danger. Conse-
quently, recognition of collective rights is necessary to foster true 
equality, ·by assuring every group the right to preserve its 
institutions. 
A system of collective rights will also protect group auton-
omy.190 The essential pu.rpose of group autonomy is to guaran-
tee ethnic groups some degree of freedom from control and 
interference by the central government regarding group mat-
ters.191 Political legitimacy and stability, the lack of which have 
plagued African politics, are more likely to be achieved through 
providing some group autonomy. 192 
Finally, collective rights will help most, if not all, ethnic 
groups, especially minorities, to obtain a degree of representa-
tion in a state's political institutions. Nigeria, for example, pro-
motes this value through a so-called "federal character" 
principle, 193 which constitutionally mandates that federal and 
187 Magnet, supra note 21, at 17~. 
188 See Kymlicka, supra note 82, at 239-56. 
189 MAciNTYRE, supra note 34, at 205. 
190 Magnet, supra note 21, at I 76. 
191 /d. 
192 See text accompanying notes 229-248. 
193 NIGERIA CoNST. (1989), reprinted in XIII CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990.) See, e.g., id. §§ 14(3), 
(4). The directive "to reflect the federal character of Nigeria" is frequently referred to 
in other parts of the Constitution. The basic idea behind the "federal character princi-
ple" is that the government at alllevels......,.national, state, and local-should strive to give 
all ethnic groups in the country a sense of belonging to the nation. KENNETH R. REDDEN, 
6 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA § 1.3(J)(4) at 6.390.48 (1990). It may at first 
seem counterintuitive that the ethnic-balancing this principle seems to emphasize would 
promote national unity. On the contrary, the multi-ethnic character of the country, 
rather than overlooking reality, deals courageously with ethnic diversity and provides for 
a stronger, more stable nation. See id. 
1992 Ethnic Identity 35 
state governments reflect the country's ethnic diversity in its 
more important political institutions. 
In sum, the liberal perspective on constitutional design tends 
to favor assimilation. Assimilation is unlikely to succeed in ad-
dressing the fundamental problems many African countries 
face-the crises of legitimacy and integration arising from ethnic 
diversity and division. In countries such as Ethiopia and the Su-
dan, these problems have become acute, threatening disintegra-
tion of the state itself. These problems require a new approach 
to constitution-making that addresses not only individual rights 
but also essential collective needs of ethnic groups. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN AFRICA 
A new approach to constitutionalism in Africa should go be-
yond the discourse of individual rights and embrace the collec-
tive rights of ethnic groups. Ethiopia, for example, has recently 
embarked upon such an approach. Section A presents in sum-
mary form the elements of this approach and the rationales be-
hind them. Section B evaluates the importance of these rights to 
ethnic identity and cultural diversity. This section also suggests 
some pitfalls that the recognition of collective rights may entail 
and offers suggestions for minimizing or avoiding them. In par-
ticular, the final section addresses the tension that exists between 
collective and individual rights and suggests an approach to re-
solve that tension. 
A. What Collective Rights Should African States Recognize? 
The particular rights that a state may choose to recognize will 
vary from country to country and even within one country, be-
cause the needs and characteristics of ethnic groups vary. 194 
Some groups may find collective rights to land essential to their 
survival and development, 195 while others may find language or 
194 See generally Sanders, supra note 117, at 382. 
195 Land rights are extremely important for indigenous peoples. According to a 
statement widely attributed to a Nigerian chief, land belongs to the dead, the living, and 
the yet to be born. This statement neatly summarizes the deep and special relationship 
that exists between indigenous peoples and their land. A U.N. Report described this 
relationship in more elaborate fashion: 
It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual special relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence as such 
· and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture. · 
For such peoples, the land is not merely a possession and a means of pro-
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culture crucial. In general, the current approach of the Ethiopian 
government illustrates several ways a state may accommodate 
ethnic diversity through recognizing collective rights of ethnic 
groups. The Ethiopian approach is contained in the Transitional 
Period Charter196 that came into force as part of an effort to lead 
the country through a transition to democracy following nearly 
two decades of military dictatorship and ethnic strife. The Char-
ter recognizes the right of an ethnic group to: 
(a) preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its 
culture and history, and use and develop its language; 
(b) administer its own affairs within its own defined terri-
tory and effectively participate in the central govern-
ment on the basis of freedom and fair and proper 
representation; and 
(c) exercise its right of self determination of indepen-
dence when the concerned [ethnic group] is convinced 
that the above rights are denied, abridged or 
abrogated. 197 
The Charter also affirms individual rights, as declared in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 198 This international 
declaration proclaims the fundamental freedoms and rights of in-
dividuals in a liberal society, which accepts the natural equality of 
all its members and the corresponding right to participate 
equally in the process of government. 199 
The Charter's affirmations are a groundbreaking develop-
ment in Africa. They indicate an emerging trend among consti-
tution-makers in Africa to consider seriously the collective claims 
duction. The entire relationship between the spiritual life of indigenous peo-
ples and Mother Earth, and their land, has a great many deep-seated 
implications. Their land is not a commodity which can be acquired, but a mate-
rial element to be enjoyed freely. 
U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Population, at~~ 196-97, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 I Add.4 ( 16) (1986), quoted in 
Addis, supra note 118, at 662. See also AYITIEY, supra note 140, at 285-86. "In virtually 
all traditional African societies, there was a widely held belief that the land belonged to 
the dead ancestors. The living only exercised a right to use it." /d. 
Ayiuey states that the preamble to the constitution of the Saan (Bushmen of 
Namibia) provided, "The land of our villages belongs to our fathers' fathers and our 
mothers' mothers." !d. at 285. 
I 96 TRANSITIONAL PERIOD CHARTER OF ETHIOPIA, NEG. GAZETA (50th Yr. No. 1, 
1991 ). 
197 /d. art. 2. 
198 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, at 71, 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also ARTHUR R. RoBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WoRLD 
196 (2d ed. 1982). 
199 Eide, supra note 62, at 1337. 
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of ethnic groups.200 These affirmations also impliedly reject the 
traditional African view that official recognition of ethnic diver-
sity is incompatible with the goals of nation-building, political 
stability, and modernization.201 
Recognition of both individual and group rights suggests a 
broad idea of democracy that emphasizes equality among individ-
uals and groups.202 Democratic equality among groups implies 
cultural pluralism,203 which in turn stresses the importance of di-
versity and the contribution of distinct cultures to the society's 
200 The Namibian Constitution of 1990 provides for similar rights but in a diluted 
form. Article 19 guarantees that: 
[e]very person shall be entitled to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain, and pro-
mote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms of this 
Constitution and further subject to the condition that the rights protected by 
this Article do not impinge upon the rights of others or the national interest. 
Q;loted in Berat, supra note 69, at l. This provision tracks the language of article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, except that the Namibian provision 
does not explicitly guarantee that an individual may enjoy culture, language, and tradi-
tion "in community with the other members" of ethnic or religious groups. Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). The covenant's language, "in 
community with other members," suggests a recognition of a collective right to lan-
guage or culture. SeeS. Ward Atterbury, Note, The Protection of Language Rights in Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: A Proposed Draft Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 
471, 538 (1992). But for many, the rights recognized by article 27 are individual rights. 
See, e.g., Addis, supra note 118, at 638 ("[A] close reading of the article suggests that 
ultimately that which is protected is the right of the individual to choose with whom to 
associate and under what conditions, rather than the rights of the groups which are 
mentioned in the article"); ARTHUR R. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 37 (2d 
ed. 1982). These scholars emphasize the fact that Article 27 accords the rights to mem-
bers of ethnic or linguistic groups. 
201 See, e.g., Shivji, supra note 11, at 389. 
202 Although the rights to autonomy and separate identity are easily justified by 
democratic principles, the right of secession is not. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self 
Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991). Traditionally, 
secessionists have based their claim to self-determination on democratic principles of 
consent and popular sovereignty. !d. at 184. The claim rests on a simple syllogism. 
Government must stem from the consent of the governed. A government which lacks 
consent has no political legitimacy. Because consent is the keystone of legitimacy, a 
disaffected ethnic group has the right to secede from an existing state. /d. This logic is 
misleading: "Government by the consent of the governed does not necessarily encom-
pass a right to opt out. It only requires that within the existing political unit a right to 
participate through electoral processes be available." !d. at 185. 
203 One commentator distinguishes between " 'liberal pluralism' " and " 'corporate 
pluralism.' " Milton M. Gordon, Toward a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Rela-
tions, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 29, at 84, 105-06. Under liberal 
pluralism, the government refrains from the "recognition of racial, religious, language, 
or national origins groups as corporate entities with a standing in the legal or govern-
mental process, and [prohibits] the use of ethnic criteria of any type for discriminatory 
purposes, or conversely for special or favored treatment.'' !d. at 105. "Under corporate 
pluralism racial and ethnic groups are formally recognized as legally constituted entities 
with official standing in the society." /d. at 106. The government actively encourages 
and reinforces pluralism. Canada illustrates such a society. See generally John Porter, 
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richness.204 Recognition of both individual and collective rights 
is the means by which individual identity may be respected, col-
lective survival ensured, and assimilation resisted. 
B. Assessing the Importance of Collective Rights 
1. The Right to Separate Language 
Recognition of an ethnic group's right to preserve its identity 
satisfies the members' sense of collective self-worth and belong-
ing in the polity. It also assures an ethnic group's freedom from 
forced assimilation into a dominant culture.205 Language is one 
institution that preserves a group's identity.206 Conversely, it is 
also an effective means of assimilation. 
Those who view language solely in terms of its communicative 
function will overlook the connection between language and 
preservation of a separate identity. Some may argue that select-
ing a primary language for a nation has very little or nothing to 
do with cultural domination or assimilation. Rather, the official 
use of such language reflects a need to find a uniform means of 
communication which also serves the needs of national unity and 
economic and political modernization.207 Adopting this view, 
many African countries employed. English or French as a means 
to achieve national integration through language without, they 
believed, surrendering Africa's cultural identity.208 Proponents 
of this view may deny that the official use of a particular language 
was motivated by the policies of assimilation and homogeneity; 
this instrumental view of language assumes that it is a "vehicle 
equally fitted to convey any beliefs"209 without regard to culture. 
Ethnic Pluralism in Canadian Perspective, in ETHNICilY: THEORY AND ExPERIENCE, supra note 
29, at 267. 
204 Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 136 ( 1978). 
205 See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & 
COMP. L. Q 102, ll8 (1976). 
206 See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. 
207 Some scholars recognize that language functions in two ways: as a vehicle for 
transmitting a particular culture and as a culturally neutral means of communication 
which allows people with different cultural backgrounds to communicate with one an-
other in the same political community. See Rainer Knopff, Language and Culture in the 
Canadian Debate: The Battle of the White Papers, 6 CAN. REv. STUD. NATIONALISM 66, 67 
(1979). Those who view language as a utility argue that governments can enact official 
languages without necessarily implying or legislating thereby official cultures. !d. 
Under this view, the success of a particular culture owes little or nothing to the language 
of its expression. For a refutation of this proposition see infra notes 210-214 and accom-
panying text. 
208 See Wani, supra note 32, at 632, 636. 
209 ROGER W. BROWN ET AL., LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND CULTURE 1.(1958). 
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This assumption is inaccurate because language serves pur-
poses beyond its uses of communication and national integra-
tion. First, linguists have noted the importance of language as a 
general frame of reference for its users' thoughts and ideas.210 
Benjamin Lee Whorf has shown that relationships exist between 
a language's general aspects and the cultural milieu in which it 
develops.211 Paul Henle describes this relationship by saying, 
"The world appears different to a person using one vocabulary 
than it would to a person using another."212 Language also satis-
fies the human desire for cultural security and continuity. 
Ethnolinguists have identified the role of language in the trans-
mission of culture from one generation to the next ("encultura-
tion") and from one culture to another ("acculturation").213 ."In 
the ethnic context, language is both the vehicle and. the expres-
sion of cultural values.'?14 Experience shows that when an eth-
210 Piatt, supra note 94, at 896. See also In re ManitobaLanguage Rights, 1 S.C.R .. 721 
(1985), in which the Supreme Court of Canada noted the foundational importance of 
language: 
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential role that lan-
guage plays in human existence, development and dignity. It is through lan-
guage that we are able to form concepts; to structure and order the world 
around us. · 
/d. at 744. 
211 Piatt, supra note 94, at 896. 
212 /d. at 897 (citing BROWN ET AL., supra note 209). !he relationship between 
"world-view" and language is reciprocal: 
If we are right in claiming an influence of vocabulary on perception, it might be 
expected that vocabulary would influence other aspects of thought as well. The 
divisions we make in our experience depend on how we perceive and so would 
be subject to the same linguistic influence as perception. Once again, one 
would expect the influence to run in both directions. If, in thinking about the 
world, one has occasion to use certain ideas, one would expect them to be ad-
ded to the vocabulary, either directly or through metaphor; this is probably the 
primary influence. Once the term is in the vocabulary, however, it would con-
stitute an influence both on perception and conception. 
BROWN ET AL., supra note 209, at 8. 
213 Piatt, supra note 94, at 896. 
214 Leslie Green, Are Language Rights Fundamentaa, 25 OscoooE HALL LJ. 639, 656 
(1987). Professor Green argues that language rights are fundamental. One reason 
could be the "interest in the survival of language groups over time." /d. at 653. This 
interest might draw support from the fact that language is a "valuable depository" of 
human experiences of which the speakers of a language should not be deprived. /d. at 
655. But Green dismisses this as a basis for grounding a right to language as fundamen-
tal. /d. at 653-657. She argues that "[t]he fact that a language might die out is of no 
moral concern apart from the interest its speakers take in it." /d. at 656. Thus our 
"concern is not with the endangerment of a linguistic species, but with the continued 
flourishing of a group of speakers whose desire to transmit their culture to future gener-
ations is an aspect of their well-being." /d. For Professor Green, even this factor is not 
decisive because linguistic-survival is a "future-oriented interest" that is unlikely to be of 
moral concern. /d. The future is unlikely to be of great moral concern because the 
identity of languages in the distant future is problematic. /d. at 656-57. Languages 
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nic group demands the right to teach in its language, its interest 
is not only in language use but also the cultural content of the 
education.215 A group's concern for the survival of its language 
also demonstrates concern with the cultural well-being of its 
speakers.216 Thus, language is a means by which a people ex-
presses and preserves its culture. 
Language also signifies identity and expresses one's connec-
tion to a community.217 De Tocqueville observed that "The tie 
of language is, perhaps, the strongest and most durable that can 
unite mankind."218 Ironically, it is also one of the strongest di-
viders of people. A distinctive language sets one ethnic group 
apart from others. 219 For example, there is little else that divides 
Amharas and Tigreans in Ethiopia, 220 or the French and English 
Canadians. 221 Yet, despite or perhaps because of increased edu-
cation and modernization, these groups have allowed their lin-
guistic differences. to be a source of division. 
Some may doubt the role of language as a vehicle of cultural 
transmission or a source of ethnic identification. 222 But no one 
can ignore its value as a source of dignity for the individual and 
for the group. Evidence indicates that a language becomes a 
change over time owing to factors such as immigration, patterns of residence, and power 
to use one's language in public. !d. at 657. Consequently, Green argues, the better way 
to understand our interest in language should focus on the concern for "linguistic secur-
ity." !d. at 658 (emphasis deleted). According to her, linguistic security has two aspects: 
/d. 
First, speaking a certain language should not be a ground of social liability; and 
second, one's language group should flourish. Note that the latter is not the 
future·oriented value of survival, but the present-oriented value of the human 
relations and interactions which a shared linguistic culture makes possible. 
215 See Dinstein, supra note 205, at 119. 
216 Green, supra note 214, at 656. 
21 7 /d. at 659 (noting that "most people feel an attachment to their mother tongue 
which cannot be reduced merely to its utility in communication: it is for them a marker 
of identity, a cultural inheritance and a concrete expression of community"); Zoglin, 
supra note 94, at 24; Karst, supra note 25, at 351-52. 
218 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQ.UEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 29 (Reeve trans., 1945). 
219 Karst, supra note 25, at 352. Professor Karst notes that "one consistent unhappy 
consequence" of language differences in the United States has been "discrimination 
against members of the cultural minority." /d. 
220 One Ethiopian scholar has observed, "Ethiopia is the despair of the compulsive 
classifier." Abraham Demoz, The Many Worlds of Ethiopia, 68 AFR. AFF. 49, 49 (1969). 
Nevertheless, applying a number of criteria of classification-"genetic, regional, linguis-
tic, religious, ecological, social structurai"-Donald Levine classifies Amharas and 
Tigreans in the same category. DoNALD N. LEVINE, GREATER ETHIOPIA: THE EvoLUTION 
OF A MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY 33, 36-37 (1974). 
221 Green, supra note 214, at 659. 
222 See supra notes 207-208. 
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source of embarrassment223 rather than a source of identity for 
its speakers when the language lacks societal status and its speak-
ers are denied the right to view the world through it. 224 
People whose self-esteem is injured from a lack of linguistic 
security often react negatively. The experiences of Sri Lanka and 
Ethiopia are instructive. Sri Lanka is divided mainly between two 
ethnic groups-the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. 
When the government declared Sinhala the country's only official 
language, it evoked in the Tamils a fear of cultural and linguistic 
demise and feelings of inferiority such that they resorted to vio-
lence to demand linguistic equality.225 
The civil war in Ethiopia also cannot be understood without 
understanding that the issue of language was a major precipitat-
ing factor. As in Sri Lanka, non-speakers of the official language, 
Amharic, came to view the recognition of Amharic as a symbol of 
the preeminence and prestige of Amharic speakers. The lack of 
official status for their own languages engendered feelings of re-
sentment, subordination, and denigration of self-worth. Reflect-
ing this concern, the Ethiopian Charter now affirms the right of 
an ethnic group to promote its culture and to use and develop its 
language. It is aimed at reassuring ethnic groups of their collec-
tive dignity, equality, and separate identity. 
Because African nations are characterized by broad linguistic 
diversity, official recognition of all the languages spoken in a 
country would be impractical. Therefore, justifications must be 
found for making some languages official at the national level 
and some at the regional level. How widely a language is spoken 
in a given country or parts of it would seem to provide one im-
portant justification. For example, of the eighty-plus languages 
that exist in Ethiopia, only two or three are widely spoken.226 
One or more of these may be given official status at the national 
223 Green, supra note 214, at 658 (noting the embarrassment that immigrants experi-
ence as they "surrender" to a dominant culture). In the United Kingdom and the 
United States, for example, cultural and societal forces have pushed non-native English 
speakers to learn English in order to succeed in the society. Piatt, supra note 94, at 898 
n.67. 
224 See Piatt, supra note 94, at 896-97. 
225 SeeM. L. Marasinghe, supra note 47, at 560-61. During the parliamentary debate 
regarding Sinhala's official status, a participant stated, "[The Tamils] do not want to feel 
that their language and through their language, themselves are looked down upon as an 
inferior section of the people of this country." /d. at 561. 
226 The most widely spoken language is Amharic. No other language comes close to 
the position it occupies as a common means of communication in government, educa-
tion, and the media. The next most commonly spoken languages in descending order 
are Oromo, Tigrigna, and Somali. 
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level, 227 and a few others could serve as regional languages. 2: 8 
Language recognition, however, should not be a quantitative 
exercise. If language is to be considered a basic means of cul-
tural reproduction, the rights of ethnic groups to teach in their 
languages and to use them in local government should be 
respected, even if some languages do not otherwise become 
official. 
2. The Right to Autonomy 
A second way an ethnic group may preserve its distinctiveness 
is through autonomy. This approach is exemplified in the Span-
ish constitution, which "recognizes and guarantees the right to 
autonomy of the nationalities and regions [comprising 
Spain]."229 The Canadian federal structure, which grants a mea-
sure of autonomy ~o Quebcrc, is designed to accomplish the same 
purpose. 230 
The Ethiopian Gharter, in so far as it allows ethnic groups to 
administer their own affairs, is also designed to provide the insti-
tutional means for distributing collective rights. The Charter en-
visions the creation. of autonomous regions defined by their 
ethnic character to allow each ethnic group, or at least the domi-
nant groups, to manifest their identity through their region. Ni-
geria is an earlier example of how autonomous, ethnically 
homogenous states were created to comprise a federal union.231 
The right to autonomy is important for several reasons. Most 
significantly, it provides an institutional means to satisfy the psy-
chological needs of ethnic groups for recognition of their iden-
227 Doing so would be following the exa.mple of the 1987 Accord between India and 
Sri Lanka, in which Sri Lanka declared Tamil an official language at par with Sinhala. 
Marasinghe, supra note 47, at 566. In addition, English was declared a "link language." 
!d. 
228 This is essentially the approach India took to deal with its "linguistic confusion." 
See Ainslie T. Embree, Pluralism and National Integration: The Indian Experience, 27 J. INT'L 
AFF. 41, 48-49 (1973). As in Sri Lanka, India adopted English as well as Hindi as link 
languages, while local languages are used for education. /d. at 49. 
Similarly, although the Spanish constitution declares Castilian to be the official na-
tional language, it allows other languages to be official in their respective regions. SPAIN 
CoNST. art. 3(2) ( 1978), reprinted in XVI CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CoUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991). 
229 See SPAIN CoNST. art. 2, supra note 228. 
230 See, e.g., CANADA CoNsT. §§ 71-80, reprinted in III CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouN-
TRIES OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991). 
231 See Ziyad Mota Ia, The Record of Federal Constitutions in Africa: Some Lessons for a Post-
Apartheid South Africa, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 233-34 (1990). 
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tity. 232 Such an arrangement serves to reassure each ethnic 
group that it enjoys equal status with other ethnic groups. Essen-
tial to the idea of autonomy is freedom from centralized control 
and interference.233 And autonomy is the hallmark of a federal 
constitutional arrangement, which has a number of advantages. 
One advantage is the latitude the federal system offers for lo-
cal experimentation with different laws.234 Another is freedom 
from government tyranny.235 · This is especially important for 
countries in Africa where the state has historically shown a ten-
dency to assert unbridled power. Finally, federalism allows eth-
nic diversity to exist.236 For AfriCa, this means federalism 
provides a framework for institutionalizing diversity. A carefully 
designed federal structure offers a real possibility for neutralizing 
ethnic conflict and reducing ethnic antagonism~ 
A different constitutional model based on a unitary state cur-
rently prevails in much of Africa. The governments of such uni-
tary states commonly exercise centralized control of activities and 
allow little diversity in economic, legal, or cultural affairs.237 A 
unitary state has the tendency to regard the whole country as a 
single decision-making unit.238 
The type of diversity that generally leads a nation to federal-
ism varies from country to country. In 'many African states, it is 
the desire of ethnic groups to protect their identities, languages, 
and cultures. Under federalism each ethnic group retains the 
freedom to pursue its own culture and tradition and to use its 
own language. In terms of language, for example, this arrange-
ment would allow different regions to adopt different officiallan-
232 See Ivo D. Duchacek, Antagonistic Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Communities, Pus-
'uus, Fall 1977, at 3, 6. Territorial organization induces a sense of belonging. "[A] 
territory-bound political authority still continues to elicit a greater degree of rational 
support and emotional identification-both essential conditions for an effective collec-
tive action-than any other non-territorial and functional alternative." /d. at 5-6. 
233 Although the term "autonomy" is vague and has no accepted definition, inde-
pendence from governmental or political interference in internal affairs is an essential 
component. See Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in Interna-
tional Law, 74 AM. J. INT. L. 858, 860 (1980). 
234 Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 
483, 498 (1991). 
235 See id. at 498-99. 
236 Cf id. at 498. See also Motala, supra note 231, at 230 ("The federal form of state 
allows the people of each of the units to express their individual identities within their 
own territory"). 
237 Motala, supra note 231, at 226. 
238 /d. at 227. 
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guages, although the federal government may decide to use one 
or more languages to serve as national ones. 
Although using federalism as· a framework for dealing with 
ethnic strife and expressing cultural diversity is basically sound, 
'ethnic' federalism has its pitfalls. To appreciate these dangers, it 
helps to consider the difference between ethnic federalism and 
political federalism present in the United States. In the United 
States, state boundaries bear little "correlat[ion] with deep eth-
nic, cultural, religious, and linguistic divisions."239 Under ethnic 
federalism, by contrast, ethnicity is the principal and decisive ba-
sis upon which the federation would be organized. Since the re-
gions created under such a system will be identified with a major 
ethnic community, each region is likely to see itself as a distinct 
political entity. Once ethnic groups are given significant auton-
omy in their own region, it may be difficult to persuade these 
groups, some of which may be accustomed to conflict, to cooper-
ate with one another for the sake of national unity. Thus, ethnic 
federalism may endanger the integrity and stability of the state by 
nurturing rival nationalisms alongside one another. 
This is not idle speculation. The experiences of the erstwhile 
European communist states vividly demonstrate the hazards of 
compelled ethnic federalism. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia relied on ethnic federalism as one of the funda-
mental legal means to solve the "nationality problem."240 But 
they sought to contain the destructive potential of ethnic identity 
through a civic culture based on the ideology of Marxism-Lenin-
ism and the discipline of a unitary party structure-the commu-
nist party. Yet, common national interests were maintained. The 
demise of the party and its ideology led to preoccupation with 
parochial, ethnic self-interests and caused national disintegra-
tion, chaos, and civil war. 
There is a profound lesson in this for Africa: A state founded 
239 Amar, supra note 234, at 505. 
240 Viktor Knapp, Socialist Federation-A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality 
Problem: A Comparative Study, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (1984). Lenin laid down the 
theoretical foundations for ethnic-territorial federalism. /d. "Lenin perceived two as· 
pects of the multinational state: the necessity of unity of the working people, and the 
national and territorial autonomy of the individual nations living in the territory of the 
multinational state." !d. As a theoretical matter the unity of the people and the diversity 
of their ethnic identities "meet and merge dialectically." /d. The constitutional ex-
pressed this unity in diversity in the language that "[t]he Union of Soviet Socialist Re· 
publics is a unitary, federal, multinational state, formed on the basis of the principle of 
socialist federalism." /d. at 1215. Furthermore, the constitutional monopoly of power 
enjoyed by the communist party guaranteed the social homogeneity of the state. !d. 
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on ethnic federalism in a context where separatist inclinations are 
high and unifying institutions are weak is unlikely to survive as a 
unified nation. Ethiopia, for instance, faces a serious risk of na-
tional disintegration given the de facto separation of Eritrea, the 
demonstrative effect of the separation on other regions, the de-
mobilization of the national army in the wake of its defeat by Eri-
trean separatists and other essentially ethnicity-based guerrilla 
armies, and the absence of strong national parties. Thus, African 
constitution-makers must consider alternative constitutional 
models that accommodate ethnic diversity without impairing na-
tional unity. 
Federalism is a serviceable constitutional model for Africa 
and any search for models should begin with it. But each ethnic 
group should not necessarily be given its own separate state or 
federal unit. To do so will, in some countries, create large con-
centrations of regional power that will rival national power and 
even threaten state integrity. The original federal structure of 
Nigeria, for instance, created three main.regions, each controlled 
by a single ethnic group.241 This structure fostered an attitude of 
self-sufficiency, intolerance, and separatism among the re-
gions.242 Effective fe~eralism. requires fostering a national 
awareness that by itself each region is relatively insignificant. 243 
One way to achieve this diminution is to break up large ethnic 
regions into smaller units, taking into account other factors such 
as history, economic viability, administrative convenience, and 
other criteria calculated to encourage interdependence and mu-
tual cooperation. 
A federal arrangement along these lines would promote a 
sound cultural diversity, but minimize the risk of disrupting na-
tional unity. Federalism in Africa should combine the goals of 
national unity and ethnic accommodation. Equating ethnic au-
tonomy with ethnic federalism, and thereby drawing lines on 
solely ethnic grounds, is inadequate for this task. It does not 
contain sufficient safeguards to withstand the centrifugal forces. 
The more subtle approach advocated here allows an ethnic 
group to pursue its language and culture in an ethnically homog-
enous unit. But the need for cultural diversity does not require 
that this unit comprise an entire ethnic group. 
A workable federal system in Africa-one which contains or 
241 NWABUEZE, supra note 85, at 134, 149-50. 
242 /d. at 148. · 
243 See id. 
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minimizes the danger of ethnic separatism-also requires a suita-
ble party system. In the past, many African countries adopted 
single party systems to resolve the problem of ethnic divisive-
ness. But the days of the one-party system are gone. Many Afri-
can countries tried that approach with disastrous consequences. 
Moreover, despite its superficial appeal, banning ethnic parties 
or permitting only a predetermined number of national parties, 
as some countries in Africa have done, 244 is unrealistic. Strong 
ethnic feelings cannot be contained by such policies. Limiting 
the number of parties or banning those that are ethnically-based 
is wrong in principle, for such a policy contradicts the freedom of 
association which liberal constitutionalism rightly proclaims and 
upholds. 
A well-designed electoral system is needed for federalism to 
work in Africa. Such a system "is by far the most powerful lever 
of constitutional engineering" for ethnic accommodation and 
harmony. 245 Nigeria offers an intelligent electoral system for 
choosing a president in a divided society. To win the presidency, 
a candidate must meet two requirements. She must win the ma-
jority of the votes nationwide, 246 and one-third of votes in two-
thirds of all the states.247 Thus, this system encourages candi-
dates to reach out beyond their ethnic regions and strike com-
promises with other parties. 
3. Self-Determination and the Right to Secede 
The Ethiopian Charter contains one of the more radical col-
lective rights an ethnic group might claim-: the right of self-deter-
mip.ation. 248 International law defines the right to self-
determination as the right to independence for a people under 
foreign domination.249 The existence of the right to self-deter-
mination for an ethnic group within the framework of an existing 
244 Nigeria, for example, has decided to limit the number of parties in the Third 
Republic to two. The decision was "shaped by the desire to challenge the tendency for 
political competition to reduce to a three-player ethnic game between [sic] the Hausa-
Fulani, Yoruba and lbo with the ethnic minorities as electoral pawns." Rotimi Timothy 
Suberu, Federalism and Nigeria's Political Future: A Comment, 87 AFR. AFF. 431, 437-38 
(1988). This gimmick is not a failsafe method to contain ethnic politics in Nigeria, as 
there is anxiety about the two major political parties forming along the north-south eth-
nic divide. !d. at 438. 
245 See HoROWITZ, supra note 15 at 163. 
246 NIGERIA CONST. art. 132 (1989), reprinted in XIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990). 
247 !d. 
248 See supra note 197. 
249 Dinstein, supra note 205, at 108. 
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state is controversial under international law.250 Nevertheless, 
the Ethiopian Charter indicates that a state may grant ethnic 
groups the right to secede when .their rights are "denied, 
abridged or abrogated. " 251 
Creating a constitutional right to secede is generally inconsis-
tent with the practice of modern federal constitutions. Aside 
from the Soviet Union and a few other Eastern European coun-
tries,252 federal constitutions, including that of the United States, 
have been silent on the question of secession. Moreover, U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence suggests· that the acceptance of a 
federal constitution mandates the establishment of a permanent 
and indestructible union.253 The U.S. Supreme Court has re-
jected the argument that the nature of the federal union creates 
an implied right to secede.254 
Why then would a constitution grant the right to secede, as 
the Ethiopian Charter does, and thereby legalize the destruction 
of the very union it purports to establish? The Charter suggests 
some reasons. Recall that the right to secede.under the Charter 
exists only if an ethnic group's rights to separate identity, lan-
guage, culture and autonomy are ·not· respected. Advocates 
favoring such rights would argue that these rights are fundamen-
tal to ethnic integrity and are meaningless without some remedy. 
The right to secede is that remedy. Thus, these advocates might 
justify secession rights as an effective deterrent to government 
violation of an ethnic group's rights.255 A government faced with 
such a drastic sanction is unlikely to risk incurring it. Further-
more, in countries experiencing profound ethnic divisions, the 
existence of a secession right is essential to allay ethnic fears and 
suspicions. Finally, experience suggest~ that whenever ethnic 
movements play a central role in constitution-making, the right 
to secede figures prominently.256 
250 See id. 
251 See supra note 197. 
252 See UNION OF SoviET SociALIST REPUBLICS CONST. art. 72, reprinted in XVIII CoN-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz 
eds., 1990) ("Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the 
USSR"); DRAFT CoNSTITUTION OF THE CzEcH AND SLoVAK FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC art. 
3(3), reprinted in IV CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIES OF THE WoRLD (Albert P. Blau-
stein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). 
253 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) ("The Constitution, in all 
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States"). 
254 See id. at 724-26. 
255 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 635. 
256 See id. at 634. 
48 STANFORD jOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 29:1 
But creating a constitutional right to secede is ill-advised as a 
practical matter and ill-conceived as a matter of constitutional 
theory. As a practical matter, those convinced that the right to 
secede is self-evident have trouble realizing that secession has no 
stopping point. Once started, the process spawns a never-ending 
cycle.257 The separation of one region not only leads to the sepa-
ration of other regions but also subjects the seceding unit to sim-
ilar claims internally.258 In Ethiopia, for example, Eritrea's de 
facto separation from Ethiopia has encouraged similar claims by 
other regions of the country.259 Given the arbitrariness of the 
national boundaries that colonial powers fixed for these states, a 
right to secede risks national disintegration. African states there-
fore should be opposed to secession. 
While the right to secede has a great deal of political and psy-
chological value,260 it is of little practical value to ethnic groups. 
No legal mechanism can exist to enforce this right. Even if the 
right were subject to judicial review, its enforcement would re-
quire the cooperation of the very state resisting the attempt to 
secede. "[W]hen a people endeavours to secede from an existing 
State, the latter is not apt to accept calmly the prospect of its 
being carved up between several peoples, and it tends to resist 
the secession movement."261 Some may discount the problems 
of secession because the right may only be invoked upon a failure 
to respect the rights of ethnic groups. "A state that violates its 
textual commitments to civil rights and liberties will probably not 
respect its textual commitment to secession. " 262 Therefore a 
constitutional right to secede provides no firm legal basis for in-
dependence. Consequently, it makes more sense to address the 
motivations underlying claims to secession. 
257 See also Addis, supra note 118 at 628 n.38 (arguing that "more than a mere identi-
fication of an ethnic unit in a given territorial unit and a complaint by that unit must be 
required before secession is advocated as a solution to the problem of inter-ethnic con-
flict. Otherwise, we shall be locked into a never-ending claim for secession"). 
258 See HoROWITZ, supra note 28, at 589. Secessionist regions are themselves ethni-
cally heterogeneous. For example Eritrea, which for all practical purposes has seceded 
from Ethiopia, is characterized by deep historical, religious and ethnic divisions. The 
case of southern Sudan, which also is seeking secession, is the same. At the present 
time, both regions appear to maintain a united stance against the center. The attain-
ment of independence, however, is likely to increase internal ethnic divisions. See id. at 
589-90. 
259 For example, some sections of the Oromos, one of the largest ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia, have shown an inclination to secede. 
260 See Dinstein, supra note 149, at 108. 
261 !d. 
262 Sunstein, supra note 255, at 667-68. 
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As a matter of constitutional theory, the right is ill-conceived. 
A constitution has value as a "precommitment strategy."263 The 
strategy must ensure the peaceful and unhampered operation of 
democratic politics in the face of severe ethnic differences. Rec-
ognizing a right to secede does not serve this purpose. In a soci-
ety divided along ethnic lines, such a right is apt to lead to 
politics of brinkmanship rather than cooperation among ethnic 
groups. It would encourage ethnic groups to engage in strategic 
behavior aimed at obtaining benefits or minimizing burdens.264 
This is especially likely with ethnic groups that command strate-
gic resources such as natural wealth, geographic location, or a 
relatively large population. Such groups are likely to use the 
right to secede as a club to force concessions from the nation. A 
nation operating under such a threat is unlikely to be strong 
enough to protect and pursue its collective interests. 
The risk of termination or dismemberment is a fundamental 
and painful question for any country. Credible claims of seces-
sion inevitably and quickly inflame and polarize a society. Such 
an atmosphere prevents a government from conducting politics 
as usual or undertaking programs of social and economic recov-
ery. It is the function of a constitution to prescribe political 
structures and processes which provide for mutual accommoda-
tion, compromise, and negotiation. One way to accomplish this 
is to remove, wherever possible, highly contentious issues which 
will infect daily politics and routine government processes. The 
right to secede is such an issue. Consequently, refusing to recog-
nize a constitutional right of secession is an essential precommit-
ment strategy, especially if a constitution addresses the major 
sources of discomfort-autonomy and other collective rights-
that give rise to claims of secession. 
C. Limits on Collective Rights: Some General Principles 
The reluctance of states to recognize a right to secede sug-
gests a wider principle: the interests served by collective rights 
should be limited. The nature of the applicable limit will depend 
on the strength of the competing interest to be protected. 
263 /d. at 637. Professor Sunstein characterizes constitutions as "precommitment 
strategies" that "permit the people to protect democratic processes against their own 
potential excesses or misjudgments." /d. The rights that should be included in constitu-
tions are only those that arise from or protect democracy, not those that may endanger 
it. Because the right to secede has a range of harmful consequences to democratic poli-
tics, it should not be included in a constitution. See id. at 648-54. 
264 See id. at 648. 
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The need to protect state integrity is one such limit. "The 
need to safeguard the integrity of the state and to avoid encour-
aging separatism is a legitimate concern of any government. " 265 
Thus, although the state may recognize an ethnic group's right to 
express its individuality through a federal structure or some form 
of autonomy, the right does not entitle the ethnic group to or-
ganize as a single federal or autonomous unit. The collective 
right to autonomy cannot be exercised in ways that endanger 
state unity and stability. 
The state's need to promote good relations among ethnic 
groups and to foster a sense of national spirit defines another 
limit. Suppose, for example, an ethnic group enacts a law 
prohibiting the teaching of another ethnic group's language 
within its defined jurisdiction under the claim that the teaching of 
another language would threaten the survival of its own. Such a 
ban should not be upheld because it would foster ethnic division 
and intolerance and may well provoke retaliation. The group 
seeks to ban an essential means of cultural influence and dia-
logue .. The policy would inhibit mutual understanding among 
ethnic groups and a sense of national spirit. The purpose of the 
collective right to a separate identity is to prevent forced assimi-
lation, not to preclude cultural interchange and dialogue. 
The question of setting limits on collective rights raises an-
other fundamental problem: To what extent, if at all, should in-
dividual rights limit the interests served by collective rights? 
Where the two rights conflict, how should such conflict be re-
solved? A constitutional system which is committed to both sets 
of rights naturally creates this tension. 
The fundamental issue is whether the rights of an ethnic 
group are limited by the individual rights of its members. Con-
sider the following example. A woman inherits some clan land 
from her father by a valid will. During her old age, she sells the 
land to someone who is not a member of the clan. The clan chal-
lenges the validity of the sale under customary law. Under cus-
tomary law, women have no right to sell clan land, although they 
are entitled to its use and enjoyment during their lifetime. 
This example illustrates a typical dilemma faced by a constitu-
tion committed to cultural diversity as well as individual rights. 
On the one hand, the collectiv.e right to autonomy may demand 
265 FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETH-
NIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, at 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l, 
U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.l (1979). 
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deference to the practices and preferences of the clan. On the 
other hand, such deference would deprive clan members of the 
right to challenge the clan's practices and preferences as a viola-
tion of their guarantees of individual rights. Clearly the custom-
ary law discriminates against women. Thus, a direct collision 
arises between respect for cultural diversity and a commitment to 
the fundamental liberal value of nondiscrimination on the basis 
of gender. 
One obvious solution to the problem is for the state to uphold 
the rights of the individual over the rights of the group. Such a 
solution may especially emphasize the need for a uniform, na-
tional standard governing the enjoyment of fundamental individ-
ual rights. After all, uniformity and consistency in the application 
of legal standards are central to the very idea of justice. John 
Rawls suggests that "citizens of a just society are to have the 
same basic rights."266 Similarly; Ronald Dworkin states that prin-
ciples of consistent treatment and legal integrity require govern-
ment to "extend to everyone the substantive standards of justice 
and fairness it uses for some."267 The justice and fairness argu-
ment may be especially compelling when invoked in defense of 
individuals, such as women, who are vulnerable and need the 
protection of national standards. In many regions of the world, 
including Africa, women face rules that systematically 
subordinate and oppress them. Thus, when a group seeks to ex-
ercise its autonomy in ways that discriminate against women, cul-
tural diversity invariably means 'tolerance for oppression. Should 
the state be neutral in the face of such oppression?268 The fore-
going arguments suggest a negative response. 
But such an answer raises several problems. First, as the Ethi-
opian Charter indicates, a constitutional system which is commit-
ted to respect for collective and individual rights "guarantees" 
both sorts of rights without ranking them according to their rela-
tive importance. More importantly, upholding individual rights 
266 jOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 61 (1971). 
267 RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE·165 (1986). 
268 Some scholars suggest that the state should not be neutral in the face of oppres-
sion. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in COM· 
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL fEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 77, 92 (Mark Tushnet ed., 
1990). Professor Minow argues "that it is impossible to be neutral in the struggle be-
tween points of view and a normative commitment." /d. "The notion of oppression 
enables a meeting ground between a commitment to preserve distinctive cultures and a 
commitment to implement laws against gender discrimination." /d. This approach may 
provide some guidance in many cases, but its helpfulness will be limited. Who will de-
fine oppression and from what cultural perspective? 
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against claims of collective rights, as Dworkin's and Rawls's theo-
ries of justice suggest, tends to negate the very values that a re-
gime of collective rights is intended to protect. The right to 
separate identity is intended to guarantee a group's desire to be 
different and self-defining. Similarly, the right to autonomy is in-
tended to guarantee a group freedom from external interference 
in the conduct of its internal affairs. Both are guarantees against 
cultural intolerance. They require respect even when a cultural 
practice may appear inconsistent with liberal standards of univer-
sal justice for the individual. Justice for the individual under 
these standards may well be injustice for the group. The clan 
may argue that collective rights are meaningless unless they pro-
tect its survival. State enforcement of the antidiscriminatory 
principle in this case may destroy the very existence or cohesive-
ness of the community. The clan might argue that upholding the 
land sale is tantamount to forcing the clan to accept into its midst 
unwelcome strangers. Allowing the sale might change the com-
munity's membership, organization and self-definition-changes 
that the rights to separate identity and autonomy are designed to 
avoid. 
If these arguments are persuasive, they suggest the outline of 
another approach: individual rights that impair the capacity of 
the group to continue as a group or to maintain its identity are 
presumptively unenforceable. The burden of proof would rest 
on the group. With respect to the hypothetical sale, the result 
should be the same regardless of whatever approach is followed. 
Although the clan has purported to demonstrate the group-de-
structiveness of the sale, it has not met its burden of proof. To 
meet this burden, the clan must explain how land sales by women 
impair the integrity of the community any more than sales by 
men. In both cases, strangers are admitted into the community. 
It would be a different case if customary law had outlawed all 
sales of land to outsiders, though such a case may provoke out-
siders to challenge the restriction as discriminatory. If the re-
stncuon is vital to the community's continued existence, 
however, the force of the discrimination argument would be 
minimal. 
Collective rights are meaningless unless the community is al-
lowed to survive. But the prohibition against sales by women 
seems motivated by a desire to hold women down rather than by 
the need to ensure the community's survival. Consequently, the 
right of the community must give way to the right of the individ-
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ual to nondiscriminatory treatment. Although this result favors 
the individual, the theory of the case implicitly suggests a hierar-
chy of rights: an individual right will not be upheld if a compet-
ing collective right is essential to the continued existence of the 
community. Perhaps this is not a severe limitation in most cases, 
but it is an important one nonetheless. 
An example from Canada illustrates the difficulties in assum-
ing that an individual right is more important than a collective 
right. In Ford v. Quebec,269 the Canadian Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether Quebec could prohibit the use of the English 
language on commercial signs. Quebec asserted that the goal of 
the ban was to ensure that the visage linguistique (linguistic face) of 
the province would be French. 270 The province claimed that the 
action was necessary to preserve the French language and con-
stantly to communicate to its residents the reality of a French mi-
lieu. 271 The Supreme Court held that the law violated the 
freedom of expression of citizens who did not know French.272 It 
reasoned that, although the law could have required "the pre-
dominant display of the French language," requiring the exclu-
sive use of French went further than necessary to achieve 
Quebec's purpose.273 
The foregoing analyses indicate the difficulties inherent in a 
system committed to cultural pluralism. Yet it bears repeating 
that in many other African societies, cultural pluralism is the in-
dispensable element that can allow ethnic groups to feel secure 
and that they are part of the nation. Dogmatically eliminating 
cultural diversity or subordinating the values it serves to various 
individual rights will not generate such feelings. Nor can exag-
gerating the importance of trivial cultural differences build a sta-
ble and unified nation. 
This suggests that one solution to the problem raised at the 
outset of this section is for the constitution-makers to agree on a 
hierarchy of rights in which certain individual rights would be up-
held over collective rights. Three categories of rights are basic in 
this regard. The first is the right to life and security of person, 
including freedom from torture, slavery, servitude, forced labor, 
and cruel and degrading punishment. The second category is the 
269 2 S.C.R. 712 (1988). 
270 !d. at 71 7. 
271 See id. 
272 !d. at 718. 
273 !d. at 717. 
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right to liberty, including procedural rights to a fair trial and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and arbitrary invasion of privacy. 
The third category includes the freedoms of thought, conscience, 
speech, expression, and association. Beyond these categories, it 
is difficult to generalize about which individual rights are more 
important than collective rights. Much depends on the circum-
stances of each country. 
Ford v. QJJ,ebec and the hypothetical land sale may be used by 
opponents of group rights as examples that appear to give sub-
stance to their worst fears: the subordination of individual rights 
to collective rights. The anxious individualist may be inclined to 
dismiss collective claims to avoid the potential for such tragedy. 
But such a stance fails to recognize the danger posed by insis-
tence on uniformity and homogeneity. Ethnic groups have ex-
perienced many atrocities in the name of nation-building and 
homogeneity.274 The individualist stance, moreover, assumes 
that a cultural group is immune from internal and external pres-
sures that may lead to changes in the group's practices and cus-
toms. Indeed, one of federalist diversity's appealing qualities is 
that it offers the possibility for dialogue among different levels of 
government and different cultures. It is this dialogue which pro-
vides a "continuing referendum on first principles."275 
V. CONCLUSION 
The liberal expectancy that modernization will weaken or 
eclipse ethnic attachment has not' occurred. The Marxist predic-
tion that class consciousness will supersede consciousness of eth-
nic identity also has not come to pass. Ethnicity has proved a 
resilient force and an important source of individual and group 
self-identification. 276 
The 1990's have highlighted the dangers of ignoring or re-
sisting individual and collective claims rooted in ethnic identity. 
The vast democratic changes occurring in the world and the in-
fluence of successful and militant ethnic uprisings have come to 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
275 A. E. Dick Howard, Protecting Human Rights in a Federal System, in CoMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA, supra note 268, at 115, 132. 
276 There are ominous signs that ethnic antagonism is increasing. Even in the 
United States, the classic "melting pot," where differences of race, wealth, religion, and 
nationality are submerged or supposed to be submerged in the pursuit of democracy, 
the idea of assimilation is giving ground to the celebration of ethnicity. Will liberal 
politics become hostage to ethnic group pressure? For a discussion of this and related 
issues, see generally ARTHUR M. ScHLESINGER, jR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1992). 
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encourage, not dampen, enthusiasm for the assertion of such 
claims. Unless these claims are properly and forthrightly accom-
modated, in some regions the integrity of the nation-state as a 
unit of politics may be in jeopardy. 
African states face difficult times ahead as they emerge from 
one-party rule and military dictatorship and begin a transition to 
democracy. In the past, many of these states had sought to elimi-
nate ethnic diversity in the interest of national unity. Few can 
dispute the value and importance of national unity. But it is a 
non sequitur to think that national unity must mean ethnic and 
cultural homogeneity. Homogeneity and assimilation are ad-
verse to ethnic identity, and policies eliminating ethnic diversity 
often tend to exacerbate ethnic friction. 
In the past, African constitution-makers have consciously or 
unconsciously assumed that liberal constitutionalism, with its em-
phasis on individual rights, sufficed to accommodate ethnicity. 
Liberal constitutionalism views ethnicity with the same detach-
ment as it does religion: with benign neutrality. Thus, it is not 
surprising that while African society is ethnically diverse and pro-
foundly conscious of its ethnicity, little in the constitutions of Af-
rican states reflects this reality. It seems these constitutions were 
written for a culturally and ethnically homogenous society. 
Where the state comprises a federation of peoples, its claims 
to neutrality are difficult to sustain. State neutrality under such 
circumstances is an illusion, because frequently the state is iden-
tified with one ethnic group or another. This situation often 
leads to ethnic resentment and estrangement on the part of those 
who feel that their languages, cultures, and status. are not 
respected. These ethnic groups fear domination by the group in 
power and loss of ethnic identity through assimilation. Merely 
guaranteeing their individual rights to equality and nondiscrimi-
nation does not ensure the preservation of their separate identi-
ties, languages, and cultures. 
Recognition of this fact requires a new approach to constitu-
tionalism in Africa. Such an approach should take into account 
the rights of ethnic groups as well as individual rights. Providing 
ethnic groups with collective rights to preserve their identities, to 
use their languages, to promote their cultures, and to administer 
their internal affairs is essential for ensuring intergroup equality, 
a sense of belonging to the nation, and genuine ethnic accommo-
dation. It is disingenuous to suggest that individual worth, dig-
nity, and self-fulfillment can be respected without respecting the 
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languages or cultures with which the individual identifies. 
Collective rights also offer greater possibilities for maintaining or 
attaining state unity, legitimacy, order, and stability. Conse-
quently, respecting ethnic diversity through collective rights is a 
constitutional imperative, not a mere policy choice. 
Collective rights are not without their own dangers. The 
rights of the individual may be sacrificed in the name of or for the 
good of the community. Groups may secede and undermine the 
state's existence. A particular ethnic group may dominate power 
in the state. Care should thus be taken to minimize these dan-
gers. A bill of rights that emphasizes the basic rights of the indi-
vidual but does not ignore the right of the group to self-
preservation should minimize the first danger; an appropriately 
designed federal system should mitigate the others. But to as-
sume that ethnicity will cease to be an issue is a mistake because 
in Africa, ethnicity is central to one's self-definition and defini-
tion by others. 
